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Norman Pine 
The Impoundment Dilemma: 
Crisis in Constitutional Government 
Do we have a centralized control in this coun-
try? Do we no longer have a co-equal branch 
of government? ... I had the thought that we 
had a responsibility to appropriate funds. I 
had the thought that once Congress passed the 
appropriation bill and the President approved 
it and signed and said to the country 'this has 
my approval' that the money would be used 
instead of sacked up and put down in the 
ba~~=t~;c'Lrr;,:":J~':~. Johnson, 19591 
The average American is just like the child in 
the family. You give him some responSibility 
and he is going to amount to something ... 
If, on the other hand, you make him complete-
ly dependent and pamper him and cater to 
him too much, you are going to make him 
soft, spoiled, and eventually a very weak 
individual. 
President Richard M. Nixon, Nov. 5, 19722 
Norman Pine is a second-year law student 
at Boalt Hall, Berkeley. He researched the 
issue of impoundment as part of a larger 
study on "The OMB and Executive Usurp-
ation of Congressional Powers." This study 
was unflertaken in Washington, D.C., as 
part of the Ralph Nader Congress Project 
and is due for publication in the summer 
by Grossman Press. 
I Introduction: The President's Budget 
In accord with his view that Americans have been overly 
"pampered" by the Federal Government, President 
Nixon has presented a proposed fiscal 1974 budget 
calling for drastic cutbacks of federal social programs. 3 
Among the hardest hit projects were those providing 
assistance to urban and rural lower income groups. 
The Nixon budget seeks to stem the tide of forty years 
of governmental action and philosophy: massive federal 
spending to combat a myriad of social problems. "The 
budget proposal is perhaps the strongest evidence to 
date of the differing priorities held by the President and 
Congress. The first rhetorical salvos in this latest clash 
have already been fired by both sides. President Nixon 
maintains that the federal bureaucracy has degenerated 
into a "hodgepodge," while House Speaker Carl Albert 
charges that the Administration proposal "lays waste" 
decades of "compassionate govemment."4 
These charges and countercharges, however valid, are 
merely symptomatic of a far deeper problem. More im-
portant than which particular programs are cut in the 
proposed budget is the fact that Congressional objections 
can be easily circumvented through Presidential impound-
ment of funds. 
While at one time the budget "proposal" was seen as the 
President's recommendations on federal spending, it is 
fast becoming the formulization of his "final offer" 
which Congress can't refuse. Eileen Shanahan observed 
in the New York Times that Mr. Nixon's most powerful 
weapon in the fight is his ability to present Congress 
with a series of faits accomplis: 
The relatively short list of programs ... 
(already impounded] will be augmented by 
scores of additional refusals to spend, des-
pite what Congress has legislated, authorized 
and approprwted. 5 (emphasis added) 
Furthermore, President Nixon claims that most of the 
proposed terminations and cutbacks can be accomplished 
without Congressional concurrence.6 Thus, the President 
has decided how much he intends to spend, and Congress-
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The current unilateral budget cuts, though more ambi-
tious in scope and more defiant in tone, do not consti-
tute a radical departure from past Nixon policy. For 
years, Presidential-Congressional disputes over spending 
have been resolved in the President's favor, through im-
poundment. Timothy Ingram has noted in the Wash-
ington Monthly that "budget examiners frankly admit 
that programs are cut back when the appropriated 
amount differs from the President's budget." 7 Thus, 
for example, "the $200 million impounded for mass 
transportation [in 1971] is almost exactly the same 
figure by which Congress's appropriation exceeded the 
President's original budget request."8 
Two hundred million dollars is but a small fraction of 
the amount of appropriated funds which President 
Nixon has refused to spend. As of June, 1972, over 
$10.5 billion had been withheld for various reasons.9 
Thus, although Congressional leaders are currently be-
moaning terminations or mas.5ive cutbacks in the areas 
of housing, education, poverty, health, employment, 
water control, and agriculture in the new budget, each 
of these had already been unilaterally denied funds by 
the President in previous years.1 0 
Congress has every right to be enraged by the continued 
Presidential flauting of its will - but little right to be 
surprised. The handwriting was placed on the wall last 
October when the Senate denied the President's "re-
quest" for a spending ceiling. Citing inflationary pres-
sures, President Nixon had asked Congress for unlimited 
discretion in deciding how to keep federal spending be-
low $250 billion. Despite a strong executive lobbying 
campaign, the Senate, asserting Congressional preroga-
tives over spending, refused to accede. Undaunted, the 
President merely said that he would make the cuts any-
way. The request had apparently been made to lend 
respectability to a Presidential decision, not to influence 
the outcome of that decision in any way. A red-faced 
Congress was left to ponder the words of Timothy 
Ingram: 
increasingly, Congress is less the underdog and 
more the old fighter who is no longer even in-
vited into the ring. 11 
Though certainly an accurate description of Congress's 
current role in the budgetary process, Ingram's words 
are somewhat misleading. Congress has consistently 
turned down invitations into the "ring" and has, at times, 
dived out between the ropes to escape its responsibilities. 
The impoundment issue cannot be discussed without 
making the frank observations that Congress has: forced 
the executive to play an ever-increasing role in setting 
budgetary policy, consistently tolerated Presidential 
abuses in this area, and, until recently, refused to even 
consider making the reforms of its own budgetmaking 
process which would make impoundment wholly un-
justifiable and unnecessary. 
This essay will attempt to place the impoundment pro-
cess in its proper perspective. It will begin by discussing 
how impoundment has developed into a second and 
final presidential veto. The historical development of 
the power to impound will be examined to consider 
how and why the President has accumulated such power-
ful discretion over federal spending. Following will be 
an attempt to define the proper limits of Presidential dis-
cretion on spending with a particular emphasis on the 
statutory basis of impoundment. Because this analysis 
concludes that the statutory basis grants a very limited 
area of discretion, the administration argument for far 
broader power will be examined and challenged. The 
paper will then consider the ways in which impoundment 
has been abused by thwarting Congressional policy and 
securing partisan political objectives for the President. 
Finally, Congres.5's role in the budgetary process will be 
examined. This analysis will consider Congressional 
irresponsibility in the budgetary process, how Congress 
has responded to the impoundment problem, and the 
possibilities of reform. 
It should be noted that although previous Presidents 
have wielded the impoundment power, this article will 
: center on its use by the Nixon administration. The rea-
son is two-fold: Nixon impoundments and the Congress-
ional response are obviously of the greatest topical con-
cern. Furthermore there is little doubt that abuse of 
impoundment has reached its greatest peak under the 
current administration. 
II lmpoundment: The Veto That Can't Be Beat 
lmpoundment refers to the executive practice of refus-
ing to spend funds which have b.een duly appropriated 
by Congress and signed into law by the President. As 
will be made clear, there are certain conditions under 
which the President is expected not to spend a full Con-
gressional appropriation. Impoundment, by definition, 
excludes these situations and only refers to those refusals 
to spend funds in which the will of Congress is flauted 
or ignored. 
The rise of impoundment may be traced to two Presi-
dentially-perceived flaws in the Constitution: 1) lack of 
a line item veto'12 and 2) the Chief Executive's limita-
tion to a single veto, subject to Congressional override. 
Feeling that these limitations have left them unable to 
cope with the exigencies of complex, modern-day 
government, Presidents have developed and refined 
this awesome power. 
From a President's perspective, impoundment is pre-
ferable to vetoing for a number of reasons. Lacking a 
line item veto, a President must often sign bills, which, 
from his standpoint contain some objectionable features, 
in order to secure the desired portions of the bill. Presi-
dents, therefore will sign an appropriations bill and 
then impound the objectionable portions of the funds 
- giving themselves the item veto they constitutionally 
lack.13 
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Besides the ad hoc creation of an item veto power, im-
poundment provides additional benefits for the Presi-
dent. Impoundment, by its nature, is politically far 
more subtle than a direct veto. Vetos are often front 
page news while impoundment usually goes unnoticed 
for long periods of time. This is true both because there 
has been no systematic reporting of impoundment act-
ions to either the Congress or the media and because 
funds are often delayed or deferred for legitimate rea-
sons. Thus, it may be months or years before people 
outside the affected agencies realize that a particular 
program has been axed. This subtle form of veto has 
allowed the President to postpone or escape accounta-
bility to either Congress or the public. 
Another advantage of impoundment is that it provides 
a continuous, on-going mechanism with which to con-
trol programs. Last year th~ Administration bowed 
under Congressional pressure and released portions of 
impounded agricultural funds before the November 
election. Then the Administration chose the Holiday 
Season to undertake a quiet "farm economy drive" 
which included re-impounding the funds. Thus, Con-
gress celebrated its "victory," but farmers soon learned 
that the money would again be frozen. Unlike the one-
shot veto, impoundment gave President Nixon the 
chance to reverse himself, and to control the timing of 
his decisions. 
Finally, veto through impoundment obstructs efforts 
to reverse the action. A veto can be immediately over-
ridden by Congress, especially if strong public support 
is evidenced. However, the Congressional flow of adrena-
lin can rarely be pumped up by the time, often months 
later, that an impoundment is discovered. This is espec-
ially true if changed conditions, higher costs or a differ-
ent political milieu are present. Because. impoundment 
was presumably not anticipated by the Founding Fathers, 
there has been no quick, direct method developed to over-
ride the action once it has been discovered.14 In fact, 
Congress has never developed satisfactory oversight mech-
anisms to keep it informed of executive agency actions. 
Members of Congress frequently discover Presidential 
impoundment the same way we do - through reading 
the morning newspaper. 
Once Congress has been alerted, there are serious bar-
riers to rectifying the situation. In effect the entire legis-
lative process would have to be geared up all over again 
- from introducing a bill to committee hearings, to 
floor votes, to conference committees. And when all is 
said and done, there is no assurance .that a new bill with 
stronger language won't be ignored also. As a result, 
Congress has so far been virtually helpless to deal with 
impoundment (see section VI for a detailed look at the 
current Congressional response). 
In its nearly absolute finality lies the great attractiveness, 
and the great danger, of irnpoundment. 
III The Historical Perspective 
The need for a degree of executive control over spending 
has been Congressionally recognized since the passage of 
the Antideficiency Acts of 1905 (33 Stat. 1257) and 
1906 (34 Stat. 49). The former instituted a requirement 
that appropriated funds be apportioned over the fiscal 
year in order to prevent overspending in the early 
months, necessitating supplemental appropriations for 
the remainder of the year. Department heads of the Fed-
eral agencies were given responsibility for making the 
apportionments. 
The 1906 Act amplified this power by permitting the 
modification or waiver of the apportionments in the 
event of "some extraordinary emergency or unusual cir-
cumstances which could not be anticipated at the time 
of making such apportionment."15 Thus, by 1906 
Congress had recognized the need for some executive 
discretion over the spending of appropriated funds, but 
had also established the legal parameters (emergency, 
changed circumstances) of that power. 
This recognition of executive discretion within Congress-
ionally drawn limits has changed little over the past sixty 
years. What has drastically changed is the extent of cen-
tralization, within the Executive Office of the President 
(EOP), of budgetary decisions. Gradually, but irresist-
ibly this centralization has evolved: 
The massive spending and resultant debt occasioned by 
World War I produced the undeniable need for budget re-
form. Recognizing its own inefficiences and inadequa-
cies in complex budget areas, Congress passed the Bud-
get and Accounting Act of 1921. This law established 
the "national budget" - an itemized Presidential pro-
posal for national spending presented to Congress at the 
opening session in January. To aid the President in this 
mammoth undertaking, the Act created a Bureau of the 
Budget (BOB) and placed it within the Executive Branch, 
in the Department of the Treasury. And to solidify the 
President's control of budgetary affairs, Congress estab-
lished the principle that agency heads could only make 
their budget requests to the President, rather than direct-
ly to Congress. In short, a full-range of budget prepara-
tion and program evaluation was left largely to the 
Executive. 
The BOB was strengthened immensely in 1933 when the 
President transferred the function of "making, waiving, 
and modifying apportionments of appropriations" from 
agency heads to the Director of the BOB. Having 
strengthened the Budget Bureau, President Roosevelt 
then sought to exercise greater control over its work-
ings. Accordingly, in 1939, the President transferred 
the BOB from the Treasury Department to the Execu-
tive Office of the President. 
In 1950, Congress statutorily recognized that the full 
amount of appropriations need not be spent, under cer-
tain specified conditions. The 1950 revision of the Anti-
101 
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Deficiency Act recognized what had generally been ac-
cepted for years - funds could remain unspent to pro-
vide for special contingencies (within a department) and 
to effect savings. However, since 1950, Presidents have 
broadened this Act through "interpretation" and cited 
it as a statutory ground to justify impoundment 
(see below). 
The most recent transformation of the Budget Bureau 
occurred in 1970. President Nixon further consolidated 
Presidential control over the budgetary process by re-
organizing the BOB into the OMB (Office of Management 
and Budget). Through this action, the semi-independent 
bureaucratic agency was transformed into a direct politi-
cal extension of the White House. 
However, this evolution is only half the story. Superim-
posed on this chronology of Presidential and Congress-
ional acts is a chronology of events: the Depression, 
World War II, the Korean War, the Cold War, the Vietnam 
War, and recurring bouts of inflation and recession. Each 
crisis has added to the President's growing power to re-
direct priorities and to control fe.deral fiscal policies. 
It is clear that the growth of the impoundment power is 
merely a reflection of the larger trend for power to flow 
from Congress to the Executive branch which has be-
come increasingly evident since the days of the New Deal. 
While discussing the historical currents responsible for 
the developing imbalance is beyond the scope of this 
article, it should be borne in mind that any "solution" 
to the impoundment issue will necessarily entail broad-
based efforts to strengthen the Congress on a variety 
of fronts. 
The reason for singling out impoundment for study, 
rather than other areas of Congressional decline (e.g., 
the war-making power), is that it strikes at the heart 
of Congressional power - the control of the purse-
strings. Realization of this threat is undoubtedly the 
reason that Congressional leaders have chosen the im-
poundment issue on which to make their stand against 
Presidential encroachment. 
IV The Administration Case and Its Weaknesses 
A The Statutory Basis of lmpoundment 
As we shall see, the 1950 Revision of the Anti-Deficiency 
Act does grant the President the right to refrain from 
spending appropriated funds, under certain specified 
conditions. As a result, a good deal of confusion has 
arisen about whether there is a legal right to impound. 
Much of this confusion has been created by the loose 
usage of the word "impoundment" to denote all situa-
tions in which funds are not expended by the President. 
A President is acting consistently with the will of Con-
gress when funds are withheld to "provide for contin-
gencies" or to "effect savings," as the Act puts it. This 
statutorily-recognized withholding may loosely be 
labelled "routine financial administration," and its use 
has never been questioned. However, Presidents have 
also withheld funds in contravention, rather than in 
furtherance, bf the will of Congress, as manifested in 
the Anti-Deficiency Act. These latter cases, which con-
stitute an illegal withholding of funds, 111ay be called 
"impoundment." The purpose of this section is to at-
tempt to draw the line between the two. 
Since there is no case law, an interpretation of the Anti-
Deficiency Act must be based directly on the statutory 
language and the legislative history of the Act. The re-
vised act requires apportionments to prevent defici-
encies and to "achieve the most effective and economi-
cal use" of appropriated funds. Besides these routine 
apportionments, the act recognizes the Executive's right 
to create reserves (i.e. return unspent funds to the Treas-
ury), for certain specified reasons: 
"In apportioning any appropriation, reserves 
may be established to provide for contingen-
cies, or to effect savings whenever savings are 
made possible by or through changes in re-
quirements, greater efficiency of operations, 
or other developments subsequent to the date 
on w~ich such appropriation was made avail-
able. 6 
Professor Joseph Cotton, Chairman of the Rice Univer-
sity Political Science Department has noted that the 
legislative history of the statute and the report submit-
ted at that time by the Budget Bureau make it clear 
that a narrow interpretation of the language was held 
by the BOB as well as by Congress. This analysis indi-
cates that the BOB did not interpret changing condi-
tions broadly to justify any impoundment: 
Rather it understood it to mean change of 
conditions with reference to a particular pro-
gram to mean situations where something had 
happened in terms of a program, not infla-
tion or anything general ... that would make 
it wasteful to implement that program.17 
This narrow interpretation of the impoundment power is 
further substantiated by another portion of the revised 
Antideficiency language: 
Whenever it is determined ... (by the OMB 
Director) that any amount so reserved will 
not be required to carry out the purposes of 
the appropriation concerned, he shall recom-
mend the recission of such amount ... 18 
Obviously any reserves made with the intent to thwart, 
modify or reduce those "purposes" are made contrary 
to the Congressional policy as expressed in the Anti-
deficiency Act. 
Under authority of the 1950 Act, impoundment is being 
widely used today to reduce or kill programs which the 
President finds objectionable. To see how much of a de-
parture this is from the original purpose of the Act, one 
should consider the views of those who helped formu-
late and draft the relevent language: officials of the 
Budget Bureau. 
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Professor J.D. Wtlliams's study of the develbpment of 
impoundment reveals that following World War II, the 
Budget Bureau had reservations about its right to con-
tinue withholding funds during peacetime. 19 Lacking 
the President's broad war powers authority, the Bureau 
decided to seek Congressional sanction of the practice 
through statute. Working with the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) the Bureau helped draft the language 
which was eventually adopted in the 1950 Act. Williams 
notes that although some Bureau officials welcomed the 
new law, others disagreed: 
Was it a good thing, they asked, to have Con-
gress define a power which the Bureau had ex-
ercised up to that point without such explicit 
definition? 'He who can give, can take away'. 
Officials inclined to 'strict interpretation' em-
phasized that Section 1211 20 reduced rather 
than expanded the Bureau's authority by 
stating only two purposes [contingencies and 
saving~ for which reserves might be estab-
lished. 
It should be clear, then, that neither the Act nor its legis-
lative history will support claims that the President has a 
broad discretionary power to impound. But just when 
does the Act authorize the President to withhold appro-
priated funds? 
In general, the key factor must be not the actual with-
holding of funds but rather consistency or inconsistency 
with the will of Congress, that determines whether the 
withholding is legal. Defining the will of Congress is 
not always an easy task. However, a conscientious 
President will always attempt to understand, rather than 
obscure, Congressional intent. 
Judge Learned Hand gave an example of how the judi-
ciary would attempt to unearth "legislative intent:" 
When we ask what Congress 'intended' usually 
there can be no answer, if what we mean is 
what any person or group of persons actually 
had in mind. Flinch as we may, what we do, 
and must do, is to project ourselves, as best 
we can, into the position of those who uttered 
the words, and to impute to them how they 
would have dealt with this concrete occasion.22 
Analogously, a fair-minded President should ask "would 
Congress, sitting in my position today, want this money 
spent?" 
In most cases, it is not difficult to answer the question. 
For example, if circumstances change such that the appro-
priated funds are objectively no longer needed for the 
purpose intended, the money should not be spent. The 
unexpectedly rapid conclusion of World War II forced 
President Roosevelt to withhold funds appropriated to 
continue the war. 
Similarly, savings made possible through efficiency or 
unanticipated technological breakthroughs should be 
returned to the Treasury. Professor Williams has noted 
the classic example in which Congress appropriated a 
million dollars to control the Mediterranean fruit fly. 
Because the Department of Agriculture was able to 
accomplish the objective by spending only half a million 
dollars the remainder was "saved." 
As another example, routine financial administration 
would also require the deferral of money for production 
of a weapons system or aircraft until proper tests have 
been completed or plans laid. In none of these cases has 
the Congressional will been compromised by the expendi-
ture of fewer dollars than Congress anticipated. 
Routine financial administration gives way to impound-
ment when Presidential judgment is substituted for that 
of Congress on a question of the wisdom, merits, scope 
or speed of addressing a problem. Assume Congress 
appropriated $6 billion to reach Mars by 1977. A Presi-
dent would be unjustified in withholding $3 billion in 
the belief that reaching Mars by 1979 is "fast enough." 
Inherent in the legislative function is the right to deter-
mine the pace at which an objective will be attempted. 
Also inherent in that function is the right to determine 
the scope of a program. If Congress decided that any-
one earning less than $6000/year was entitled to a fixed 
amount of food stamps, the President would exceed his 
statutory authority by adjusting either the base level or 
the amount of stamps allocated because of the belief 
that either was excessive. "Effecting savings" cannot be 
broadly interpreted to include providing a lesser amount 
of service than Congress anticipated. By such definition, 
any withholding off unds would be made legitimate be-
cause "savings" would be created. 
If the affirmative powers of Congress to enact laws are 
to have any meaning, the President must be bound to 
execute the laws in the way, at the speed, and to the ex-
tent, that Congress ordains. Once a President declares 
the right to judge the philosophical desirability or the 
degree of success of various programs, and the right to 
withhold funds accordingly, the President's veto power 
and the right to recommend legislation become as re-
dundant as the Congress's right to enact laws becomes 
irrelevent. 
It is apparent that Congress has authorized only an ex-
tremely limited presidential power to withhold appro-
priated funds. But President Nixon has attempted to 
justify his exercise of much wider power by reference 
to the following factors: interpretation of appropria-
tions as permissive, conflicting statutory authority, 
precedent, and the U.S. Constitution. More question-
able justifications include "necessity" and "responsibil-
ity." And when other rationales have seemed insuffi-
cient, Congressional incompetence always serves as a 
defense. 
Although the Nixon Administration has often been 
accused of denying information to Congress, it has never 
103 
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been loathe to send its ablest spokesmen to defend the 
practice of impoundment. Caspar Weinberger, then-
Deputy Director of OMB, presented what probably 
constitutes the President's most cogent and complete 
defense in hearings before Senator Ervin's subcommittee 
in 1971.23 As we take up the remaining elements of the 
Administration case, Weinberger's testimony will serve 
as our primary reference point. 
B Appropriations as Permissive Ceilings 
The Administration case begins with the assertion that 
appropriations are permissive ceilings rather than man-
dates to spend and that the Antideficiency Act grants 
explicit authority for withholding funds. Weinberger 
acknowledges that the Act does place broad restrictions 
on the impoundment power, "but I do not think it is so 
broad as to prevent the President from exercising the 
power that, as we read it, Congress undoubtedly intend-
ed him to have ."24 
From the previous discussion of the statutory language 
and legislative history of the Act, it seems clear that 
what Congress "undoubtedly intended" was nothing 
more than a limited impoundment power under speci-
fied circumstances and certainly.not the broad, policy 
power which the Administration has exercised. How-
ever, to support his view of Congressional intent, Wein-
berger quotes from the House Report (No. 1797) which 
· accompanied the Act: 
Appropriation of a given amount for a particu-
lar activity constitutes only a ceiling upon the 
amount which should be expended for that 
activity. The Administration officials respon-
Sib le for administration of an activity for 
which appropriation is made bear the final 
burden for rendering all neceslfllry service 
with the smallest amount possible within the 
celing figure fixed by the Congress ... 25 
(emphasis mine) 
This excerpt hardly supports Weinberger's claim. The 
italicized portion makes clear that an appropriation 
is only a ceiling if "all necessary service" can be provided 
for a smaller amount than appropriated. If not, the full 
amount should be spent to provide the "necessary ser-
vice" to the extent mandated by Congress. Clearly, 
Presidential impoundments for "policy" as opposed to 
"efficiency" reasons are precluded by the quoted lan-
guage. Any doubt about this interpretation can be re-
solved by examining a portion of the House Report 
omitted by Weinberger: 
It is perfectly justifiable and proper for all 
possible economies to be effected and savings 
to be made. But there is no warrant or justi-
fication for the thwarting of a major policy 
of Congress by the impounding of funds ... 
(otherwise) Congress would be totally in-
capable of carrying out its constitutional 
mandate ... 26 
Normally, this should be sufficient to resolve the matter. 
However, Samuel Cohn, an OMB official who accom-
panied Weinberger, pointed out that the 1950 Omnibus 
Appropriations Bill which amended the A'.ntideficiency 
Act and which was the subject of the House Report, 
called for a $55 million reduction by the President of 
appropriated funds.27 To understand this seeming con-
tradiction between Congressional policy and Congress-
ional action, one must consider the circumstances sur-
rounding the expenditure ceiling. 
At the time in question, Congress felt the need to limit 
federal expenditure. The House proposed a spending 
ceiling which limited the President to only ten areas in 
which cuts could be made and permitted only 5% or 
10% cuts in those areas.28 However, Louis Fisher notes 
that by the time the Senate began debate on the bill, 
South Korea had been invaded and President Truman 
was already curbing non-defense spending. "Legislative 
action after this point was not much more than a sanc-
tioning of presidential war prerogatives. "29 
Thus there were two very diverse actions taken by the 
8lst Congress. The permissive nature of appropriations 
was recognized for .the purpose of allowing possible sav-
ings. But this grant of discretion to impound was limit-
ed by the requirement that "all necessary service" be 
provided, i.e., that impoundments not be made to 
thwart Congressional policy. However, in view of the 
emergency created by imminent war, the President 
was allowed, by specific Congressional grant, to cut non-
defense expenditures for the year in question. This is 
hardly a precedent for any broad impoundment power. 
For the remainder of his case that appropriations are 
permissive, Weinberger cites an opinion by Acting 
Attorney General Ramsey Clark issued in 1967. 30 
The Clark memorandum is of little aid to Mr. Wein-
berger's case. In the first place, William Rehnquist has 
noted that the opinion "appears to us to have been based 
on the construction of the particular statute (Federal 
Aid Highway Act), rather than on the assertion of a 
broad constitutional principle of Executive authority." 31 
Second, the cases upon which Clark relies for his asser-
tion that appropriations are permissive do not sustain 
the broad proposition for which they are cited. More 
specifically, the cases upon which Clark had relied in his 
opinion are Hukill v. United States, 16 Ct. Cl., 562, 565 
(1880); Compagna v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl., 316 
(1891};Lovett v. United States, 104 Ct. Cl., 557 (1945), 
affirmed on other grounds, 328 U.S. 303 (1940);and 
McKay v. Central Electric Power Corp., 223 F. 2d 623 
(1955). The Lovett and McKay cases "involved a totally 
different issue, i.e. whether the courts can require cer-
tain payments to be made despite evidence of a con-
trary legislative intent." (Hearings, p. 303). 
Neither Hukill nor Compagna deals with funds appro-
priated for public purposes; both concern private claims. 
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Although Hukill does contain some language which sup-
ports the administration position, there is contradictory 
language as well. After saying that an appropriation is 
"simply a legal authority to apply so much of any money 
in the Treasury to the indicated object," the court under-
cuts the administration position by stating: "Every appro-
priation for a particular demand, or a class of demands, 
necessarily involves and includes the recognition by Con-
gress of the legality and justice of each demand, and is 
equivalent to an express mandate to the Treasury officers 
to pay it." (Hearings, p. 302.) The case actually turned 
on questions unrelated to the impoundment issue, i.e. 
whether the claim in question had been previously paid 
by the Confederacy. 
The Compagna case is similarly not on point. The legal 
question involved was whether an appropriation to pay 
a group of musicians at a ce~tain rate should be control-
ling in the face of a statute which fixed their compen-
sation at a lower rate. The court concluded that the ap-
propriation was contingent or variable, and that there-
fore, the excess amount, over the statutory figure, was to 
provide for contingencies - not to alter the pay scale. 
Thus it is fair to conclude that although particular 
phrases from these opinions seem to support the adminis-
tration position, on closer examination, it is clear that 
there is no legal precedent for the broad claim made by 
the administration that appropriations are nothing more 
than mere authority to spend. 
The final possible argument on behalf of the administra-
tion's case is that appropriations are usually phrased in 
permissive language. In a memo prepared by the Ameri-
can Law Division of the Congressional Legislative Re-
search Service, Mary Louise Ramsey countered this 
point. She noted that when there is substantive legis-
lation directing that a thing be done, coupled with a 
later appropriation, "the two measures ... constitute a 
mandate to spend so much of the appropriation as is 
necessary to give effect to the substantive law."32 
This is only common sense. Mandatory spending lang-
uage would make it difficult or impossible to comply 
with the provisions of the revised Antideficiency Act. 
The entire process of legitimate executive discretion to 
withhold funds would be unduly hampered. Given the 
specified reasons for the reservation of funds under the 
Act, there is no reason for Congress to feel that permis-
sive spending language should be misconstrued to mean 
that Congress is somehow indifferent about whether its 
policies are being properly implemented. 
C Conflicting Statutory Authority 
As the previous discussion indicated, the Administration 
has gone to great lengths to interpret Congressional ap-
propriations and statements of policy as merely permis-
sive. However, at other times, the administration has 
erred on the side of interpreting Congressional policy as 
more binding than Congress intended. These latter act-
ion are neither the product of schizophrenia nor of re-
prospective contrition for past "sins." Rather, they are 
an integral part of the administration's determination to 
justify impoundment. 
On their face, some laws seem to lend justification to 
impoundment. These are the laws that, however worded, 
are claimed by the administration to be totally inflexible. 
They are then used to legitimize the voiding or modifica-
tion of other Congressional enactments. The adminis-
tration calls this taking care "that the laws be faithfully 
executed;" a layman may more properly label the action 
"playing both ends against the middle." 
In presenting his case for impoundment, Weinberger 
stresses that the President must execute all the laws, not 
simply authorization or appropriations. He claims that 
"several laws explicitly restrict the spending of funds 
regardless of what sums may have been appropriated on 
an individual basis. " 33 Specifically, he relies on spending 
ceilings and the public debt ceiling. In addition, the Em-
ployment Act of 1946 which calls for the maximization 
of employment, production and purchasing power is 
cited for the proposition that the President has a broad , 
responsibility to fight inflation by use of impoundment. 34 
Weinberger's case was perhaps best summarized by Sena-
tor Mathias at the Hearings: 
Mr. Weinberger has painted a very graphic 
picture of a President standing at a crossroad 
with several sets of directions from Congress. 
He then feels that he has the complete discre-
tion to use any one of these avenues .•. 35 
Examination of the three areas of conflicting statutory 
authority mentioned above illustrates the fallacy of the 
Weinberger case. 
I Weinberger's strongest case for impoundment seems 
to rest in the area of spending ceilings. Indeed, the re-
cent ceiling proposed by the administration which would 
have vested full discretion in the President to keep spend-
ing below $250 billion would have constituted, if passed, 
full Congressional approval of impoundment as it is now 
being used. The crucial fact, however, is that precisely 
because of this, the Senate voted down the proposal. 
Nonetheless, the administration has unilaterally chosen 
to limit itself to this $250 billion ceiling and has thereby 
attempted to justify current impoundments. Thus, in 
his budget message for fiscal 1974, the President said 
Holding 1973 spending to $250 billion .•. will 
be difficult . . • If we did not budget with firm 
restraint our expenditures in 1973 would be 
over $260 billion.36 
105 
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This statement makes clear that: l the President is 
proceeding as if Congress had passed his ceiling request 
and 2 Congressional actions indicate a willingness to 
spend over $260 billion. The President is certainly 
within his right to charge fiscal irresponsibility if he 
chooses, but he cannot maintain that, in the present 
year at least, Congress has given him conflicting statu-
tory obligations insofar as any spending ceiling is 
concerned. 
In the past, however, such ceilings have been imposed 
and Weinberger did rely heavily on them in his 1971 
defense of impoundment. In particular, he said that 
such "constraints ... are aptly illustrated by Title V 
of the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act 1970."37 
Weinberger was challenged on this point by Professor 
Alexander Bickel of Yale Law School who asked how 
the President could be restricted by the ceiling in ques-
tion "if (it) consists of no more than the figure he ... 
(initially estimates) plus or minus whatever Congress 
adds to it?" 38 Weinberger's response claimed that if the 
administration estimates are wrong, "the outlay ceiling 
does not expand automatically at all. It remains firm." 39 
Consequently, "a management job or a job of comply-
ing with the will of Congress has to be done."40 Thus, 
Weinberger puts the finishing touches on a beautiful 
portrait of the President, harried in his attempts to obey 
the every wish of his Congressional taskmaster. 
Careful examination of Title V indicates that Weinber-
ger's protrait is not authentic. The bill makes clear that 
the amount stated as the ceiling "is a beginning figure, 
not an ending figure." 41 Coupled with that beginning 
figure, which is based on the President's initial projec-
tion of budget outlays, is a provision which states that: 
whenever action, or inaction, by Congress, on 
requests for appropriations and other budgetary 
proposals, varies from the President's recom-
mendation (budget proposal) ... the limitation 
set forth herein shall be correspondingly ad-
justed. 42 
Furthermore, "other actions" of Congress which affect 
budget outlays will trigger the same automatic adjust-
ment mechanism.43 In short, "the language would oper-
ate continuously to adjust the ceiling ... to comport 
with ... specific Congressional actions or inactions hav-
ing budgetary impact."44 
The only contingency which would prevent adjustment 
of the ceiling would be the Budget Bureau (OMB) Direc-
tor's failure to comply with the order that he inform 
Congress of the projected effect of Congressional actions 
or inactions. In fact, the President is specifically em-
powered by the Act to seek supplemental relief if unfore-
seen and unavoidable outlay increases "cannot be accom-
modated within the overall total."45 The automatic rise 
in the ceiling was present in both the fiscal 1970 and 
1971 laws. And, it should be noted, that despite Wein-
berger's testimony, the Administration was fully aware 
of the flexibility in the ceiling. In fact, as Louis Fisher 
observed, President Nixon spoke of the Congressional 
limit as a "rubber ceiling" in the sense that "increased 
spending later enacted by the Congress would be added 
to the ceiling and decreases taken away ."46 
Thus, Administration concern for Congressional will 
seem limited to those cases in which such "concern" al-
lows the President to impose his own will by citing his 
Congressional "mandate." Congress was apparently 
aware that such was the case. Title V notes that in ini-
tiating the previous year's ceiling, the Appropriations 
Committee 
was not seeking to advance a vehicle for arbi-
trary broad-axe type cutbacks that would leave 
to the Executive the allocation of any spending 
reduction ... The whole idea was ... (to put) 
the control of total spending in the hands of 
Congress, adjustable only by the Congress.47 
2 The argument based on the second conflicting Con-
gressional authority, the debt ceiling, suffers from the 
same basic infirmity - selective interpretation. The debt 
ceiling is hardly as binding as the administration some-
times likes to claim. Over the years, Presidents have dev-
eloped a number of ways of circumventing it.48 Testify-
ing before the House Ways and Means Committee on 
March 5, 1969, Treasury Secretary Kennedy outlined 
the means the Treasury Department would employ (and 
has employed in the past) if the debt ceiling were not 
raised.49 The methods available are somewhat technical 
and need not be discussed here. What is important is 
the fact that, when it has served their ends, administra- . 
tions have had little trouble in circumventing the debt 
ceiling. As Treasury Secretary Fowler concluded before 
the Senate Finance Committee in 1967 "it has been 
very clearly demonstrated that during recent years ... 
(the debt ceiling) has proved to have no real effect on 
either the actions of the Congress or the action of the 
executive in the spending field." 50 
Thus, the administration argument that it is required to 
impound to meet the restrictions set by the debt ceiling 
loses much of its force. This is not to suggest that the 
administration should circumvent the debt ceiling. 
Whether such action would constitute a violation of the 
will of Congress would largely depend on whether the 
"loopholes" permitted are Congressional oversights or 
whether they are Congressional devices intended to per-
mit flexibility. However, no administration should be 
allowed to pick and choose its interpretation to resolve 
each situation in its own favor. In his previously cited 
memo, William Rehnquist conceded that, at times the 
ceiling may create a conflict "but it appears to us that 
the conflict must be real and imminent for the argu-
ment to have validity; it would not be enough that the 
President disagreed with spending authorities established 
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by Congress."51 The conflict could hardly be real and 
imminent if, as Senator Humphrey says, "the debt ceil-
ings increases are granted by Congress almost upon re-
quest by the President."52 If the debt ceiling is "inflex-
ible," it is so because the President has so chosen, not 
because he is unwillingly bound by Congress. 
3 Rehnquist's comment is particularly relevant in ad-
dressing the administration's third claim of conflicting 
Congressional authority - The Employment Act of 
1946. The Act was passed to give official sanction to 
the tacit acceptance of Keynesian economics. It declar-
ed that the Federal Government would henceforth as-
sume the burden of managing the national economy, in 
an effort to eliminate the "boom-bust" syndrome of 
the past. The administration has broadly interpreted 
the Act to give it wide powers to cut spending as an 
anti-inflation device. In few other areas has the Admin-
istration been as guilty of cloaking its policy disputes 
with Congress behind the veil of a Congressional "man-
date." 
Weinberger quotes Section 1021 of the Act as the Ad-
ministration's justification: 
(It is) ... the continuing policy and responsi-
bility of the Federal Government to use all 
practicable means consistent with its needs 
and obligations and other essential considera-
tions of national policy ... to promote maxi-
mum employment, production and purchasing 
power.53 (emphasis added) 
Weinberger is correct that the quoted section makes 
clear that there is a strong Congressional policy concern-
ing inflation (promoting maximum purchasing power). 
However, as in the Anti-Deficiency Act, limits are plac-
ed on the Executive's freedom to implement that policy. 
The italicized portions of the quoted section makes 
this clear. 
Note that the Act says "Federal Government" rather 
than "Executive." Obviously, Congress intended to 
have a role in promoting the economic policies of the 
country in pursuance with the law. Nowhere in the Act 
is the President given plenary power to act unilaterally 
in the fight against inflation. On the contrary, section 
1022 of the Act instructs the President to transmit an 
annual Economic Report to Congress setting forth var-
ious economic data and "a program for carrying out the 
policy declared in section 1021 of this title, together 
with such recommendations for legislation as he may 
deem necessary and desirable."54 
The requirement that the President submit a program 
and specific legislative recommendations to Congress 
would seem to preclude any broad power to act uni-
laterally in this area. 
Furthermore, the italicized portion of Section 1021 
restricts governmental action by requiring that it be 
limited to "practicable means consistent with its needs 
and obligations and other essential considerations of 
national policy." To the extent that 1) an appropriation 
is considered some form of obligation on the Executive 
and, 2) that the Congressional right to set fiscal and 
spending priorities is deemed "an essential considera-
tion of national policy," executive impoundment to 
fight inflation is in conflict with the Employment Act. 
As Professor Cooper noted, it might be "very nice, very 
convenient, and very effective"55 for the Executive to 
control inflation through impoundment, but none of 
these factors creates a legal right to impound for such 
purposes. 
Even as the Employment Act did create a right to im-
pound for inflationary control, the Administration must 
still be held accountable for the selective and often in-
consistent ways it has acted. Louis Fisher pointed out 
the inconsistency in a memo written "to examine points 
raised by Mr. Weinberger."56 Fisher observes that while 
the President's fiscal 1971 budget was "anti-inflationary," 
the budget message for fiscal 1972 spoke of a "turna-
round of this inflationary trend" thereby allowing the 
Administration to follow "more expansive economic 
policies without losing ground in the battle against in-
flation."57 Furthermore, economic priorities had shift-
ed from fighting inflation to fighting unemployment 
(which the Employment Act also establishes as a high 
national priority).58 In this regard, Fisher notes that 
one of the Administration's key arguments in support 
of the supersonic transport was that it would provide 
more jobs.59 He concludes: 
At least that is consistent with the objective 
of an expansionary budget. But why are jobs 
associated with Model Cities, urban renewal, 
regional medical programs - and other pro-
grams affected by impoundment - of less 
importance?60 
Others who feel that the Administration has used infla-
tion as an excuse for killing unwanted programs have 
asked the same basic question. After the Nixon Budget 
proposal for fiscal 1973 was unveiled, Congressman 
William Anderson expressed concern that while numer-
ous urban and rural projects were suffering impound-
ment cuts, the President had requested a 64% increase 
in the budget of the Subversive Activities Control 
Board (SACB).61 The SACB increase was particularly 
galling because the courts had so narrowly circumscribed 
its activities that, in recent years, it had come to be view-
ed as little more than a Washington sinecure.62 
The late Senator Allen Ellender, Chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, pointed out that in 1970, 
the Congress had appropriated about three and a half 
billion dollars less than the President had requested.63 
Thus, any funds impounded in that year on the grounds 
of inflation were more likely impounded because the 
107 
9
Pine: The Impoundment Dilemma: Crisis in Constitutional Government
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1973
President had different spending priorities than the Con-
-gress. Of course, all appropriations do not contribute 
equally to inflation. Thus, it is conceivable that the 
President could have impounded funds which were par-
ticularly inflationary while requesting more funds than 
Congress felt were necessary in less inflationary areas. 
Nevertheless, the presumption is that where the Presi-
dent requests $3 billion more than Congress appro-
priates and then proceeds to impound appropriated 
sums, he is more likely substituting Presidential judg-
ment on spending priorities than earnestly attempting 
to fight inflation. 
Professor Cooper has recognized the fatal flaw in the 
Administration's entire case. In each of the three areas 
of conflicting Congressional authority, the Executive 
has ignored less drastic alternatives than impoundment 
in trying to meet its obligations. Furthermore, rather 
than seeking Congressional guidance in resolving the dif-
ficulties the President has assumed plenary power to act.64 
For there to be any validity to the claim that the Presi-
dent must ignore Congressional appropriations in order 
to reconcile conflicting statutory obligations, the burden 
is on the President to prove that 1) there is an objective, 
as opposed to subjective, conflict in Congressional man-
dates, 2) the conflict must be "real and imminent" 
rather than a distant possibility and 3) there cannot be 
any less drastic remedy available to resolve the problem. 
Weinberger had opened his argument by citing the Con-
stitutional provision requiring that the President "take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed." The word 
"faithfully" makes clear that the President has a duty 
to act "in good faith." Selective interpretation to justi-
fy thwarting of Congressional policy is undoubtedly 
not what the Framers had in mind. 
D Precedent of Congressional Acquiescence 
Precedent is heavily relied upon by the Administration 
as part of its overall justification for impoundment. On 
.one level the argument can run as follows: Congress-
ional acquiescence to executive action over a period of 
time somehow constitutes creation of a right which 
otherwise might not exist. On a second level, the 
Administration might argue that acquiescence is evi-
dence that Congress has felt that its will has not been 
108 thwarted by impoundment. 
A colloquy between Weinberger and Professor Cooper 
is illustrative of the first thread of the argument. 
Based on an analysis of the BOB's highly restrictive 
view of its right to impound, Cooper asked what had 
changed since the first thirty years: "Why can the 
Budget Bureau now claim inherent power ... after 170 
years in which this has not been clear at all?" Wein-
berger retorted by citing the importance of adminis-
trative interpretation and action under the statutes. 
Cooper agreed. "I think the best case ... for the current 
withholding is precedent, Congress having allowed you 
to get away with it over the last 10, 12, 15 years."65 
In the Administration's most recent defense precedent 
was again stressed. Deputy Attorney General Joseph 
Sneed cited a case of irnpoundment dating back to 
President Jefferson in 1803 and and maintained that 
Congressional acquiescence to s,uch a long-continued 
practice "carries with it a strong presumption of 
legality. "66 
However, to the extent that Congressional acquiescence 
is considered an important element of justification, 
another Administration argument, that there is an 
indisputable inherent Constitutional right to impound 
is weakened.67 Strong reliance on Congressional assent 
is a tacit admission that contrary Congressional action 
would be significant. If the Administration truly believes 
that there is an inherent impoundment power, Congres-
sional acquiescence should be considered irrelevant in 
terms of the legal case for impoundment. 
However, the fundamental point to recognize in ad-
dressing this aspect of the Administration's case is that 
past practice cannot create a right which otherwise 
would not exist. If impoundment as practiced is indeed 
an abuse, then Congressional acquiescence merely 
serves to discredit Congress, not to justify the President. 
The Administration would certainly not argue that a 
district attorney's refusal (well within his broad discre-
tionary power) to prosecute corruption cases would, 
over a period of time, thereby justify corruption. 
As to the second argument derived from Congressional 
acquiescence, it is true that if Congress's inaction is 
interpreted as consent, then it is indeed difficult to 
argue that impoundment constitutes a thwarting of 
Congressional will. Nevertheless, the argument, though 
compelling, is not ultimately persuasive. 
In the first place, Congressional inaction is often indica-
tive of little more than Congressional inaction. There 
are so many obstacles to overcome before any bill can 
become law that drawing inferences about Congress's 
will on such a basis is simply unreliable.68 In an analo-
gous situation, concerning whether courts could con-
strue Congressional silence as assent to their interpreta-
tion of statutes, Justice Rutledge once observed: 
(T)here are many reasons, other than to indi-
cate approval of what the courts have done, 
why Congress may fail to take affirmative 
action to repudiate their misconstruction of 
its duly adopted laws. Among them may be 
the sheer pressure of other and more impor-
tant business. 69 
Justice Rutledge might have added a filibuster, a stub-
born chairman, or a conference committee deadlock, 
as possible explanations for Congressional silence in a 
particular area. None of these factors can be fully equat-
ed with Congressional consent to presidential policy. 
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Lack of deference for Congressional actions constitutes 
the second major flaw in the Administration's case. 
Implicit in the argument that Congressional will is not 
being thwarted because of alleged consent is the assump-
tion that, were Congress to remove such consent, the 
Administration would alter its practices. 
This is clearly not so. In fact, suit is now pending before 
the Supreme Court over the Administration's refusal to 
release highway trust funds which had been frozen 
despite mandatory Congressional language (see discus-
sion of Missouri Highway Trust Funds below) and John 
Ehrlichman's previously noted statement that the Ad-
ministration will not release funds which it considers· 
wasteful, even in the face of a Congressional override of 
a veto, indicates that Congressional dissent, however 
strong, is not considered binding by the Administration. 
Given this fact, any argument based on supposed Con-
gressional assent seems more a smokescreen or public 
relations device than an earnest position. 
E The Constitutional Issue 
As with any basic conflict over the respective roles of 
branches of government, both sides inevitably look to 
the Constitution to support their case. 70 Given the 
political milieu in which the Constitution was drafted, 
it is not surprising that the issue of impoundment was 
not squarely addressed. The Constitution was written 
by a group of men who shared the progressive political 
theories of their age-fear of autocratic rule by J(ings. 
Congress, and particularly the House, was viewed as the 
peculiar representative of the people. Many Constitu-
tional provisions can only be understood in this light. 
For instance, the requirements that no funds could be 
drawn but in consequence of an appropriation made by 
law or that all Revenue Bills must originate in the House 
were limitations on the Executive based on Parliament's 
previous clashes with the King. Given this political con-
text, it is not surprising that the Framers did not expli-
citly provide for the contingency that the Executive 
might wish to spend less than the Congress appropri-
ated. 
Because of this, and the absence of Supreme Court cases, 
both sides have been forced to base their Constitutional 
arguement on logic, inference, and extension. In arguing 
their cases, each side adheres to a broad view of its own 
Constitutional powers coupled with a more limited view 
of those of its opponent. 
Defining the Congressional appropriations power in the 
most limited way, the Administration claims for itself 
broad discretionary powers in spending. Citing Con-
gress's affirmative powers, opponents of impoundment 
see executive discretion limited to the implementation 
rather than the formulation of policy. The Administra-
tion claims broad inherent Constitutional powers which 
its opponents readily dispute, citing Congress's own 
enumerated powers against this proposition. Constitu-
tional clauses, case law, and arguments based upon 
"necessity" are all embroiled in the dispute .. 
1 The Limited View of Appropriations 
Weinberger opens his constitutional case for the execu-
tive branch by quoting Article I, section 9, which states 
"No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
consequence of appropriations made by law." From 
this language, two corollary assumptions are drawn: 
I) Spending is an executive function, and 2) an appro-
priation is not a mandate to spend. · 
According to Weinberger's analysis, the particular clause 
"seems to assume that the expenditure of funds-as 
distinguished from the granting of authority to with-
draw them from the Treasury-is an executive func-
tion."71 This interpretation had been strongly repudi-
ated by William Rehnquist in the aforementioned memo 
for the Justice Department. After making the broad 
statement that it is "extremely difficult to formulate a 
constitutional theory" justifying a Presidential refusal 
to comply with a Congressional spending directive, 
Rehnquist says: 
It may be argued that the spending of money 
is inherently an executive function, but the 
execution of any law is, by definition, an 
executive function, and it seems an anomolous 
proposition that because the executive is 
bound to execute the laws, it is free to decline 
to execute them.72 
Weinberger's second assumption arising from Section 9 
is based on the broadest possible interpretation of the 
"permissiveness" of appropriations and the narrowest 
interpretation of Congress's policy-making function. 
Seizing upon the negative phrasing of the language in 
the pmvision, Weinberger claims that although money 
cannot be spent without an appropriation, it need not 
be spent merely because of an appropriation.73 Though 
Weinberger concedes that the Executive can probably 
be required to spend, if mandatory language is used, he 
maintains that in the absence of such language, the 
President has broad discretionary power.74 In other 
words, appropriations are viewed as merely permissive, 
not obligatory. 
By this argument, Congress is forced to assume a 
tremendous burden. It must somehow prove that it 
·wants its appropriations spent before the Executive is 
obliged to do so. In fact, a seemingly disproportionate 
amount of time during the hearings was devoted to a 
debate on what form language must take before it is 
considered mandatory. Numerous experts solemnly 
addressed themselves to the question of how to phrase 
legalistically the concept "and we mean it."75 At one 
point, the Republican Counsel of the Subcommittee, 
Joel Abramson, was forced to conclude: "Perhaps we 
should publish a book as to what words mean 'and we 
mean it' and which ones don't." 76 Even assuming this 
could be done, it still would not resolve the previously-
discussed problem that such mandatory language would 
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Nevertheless, Weinberger maintains his case based on the 
negative phrasing of the provision. In so doing, he has 
molded a single negative phrase into the cornerstone of 
a philosophy which decrees Congressional activism. 
Because most parties to the dispute generally agree that 
Cong~ess can ultimately force the executive to spend if 
·sufficiently strong language is used, it is the Administra-
tion's shifting of the presumption from obligatory to 
permissive appropriations which has aroused such a 
furor. With this shift, many Congressionally desired 
programs would undoubtedly be lost. Thus, shifting the 
presumption would do far more than inconvenience the 
Congress or force it to be more exact. In many cases, the 
shift would determine whether Congress's will would 
prevail-or the President's. 
This raises the fundamental issue: Implicit in the shift 
of presumption is the question of the respective roles of 
Congress and the President in formulating national 
policy and priorities. Simply stated, the question is who 
did the Framers intend to have primary responsibility 
in this area? The President limited only by specific Con-
gressional prohibitions and absolutely explicit Congres-
sional demands? Or, the Congress, limited by enumerated 
grants of legislative power to the Executive such as 
recommending legislation or vetoing? The Administra-
tion would probably balk at phrasing the question in 
such a direct manner; however, when appropriations are 
characterized as ceilings within which the Executive is 
free to exercise broad discretion, the question must be 
addressed. 
2 Congress's Affirmative Powers 
Before turning to the text of the Constitution to resolve 
this dispute, one must remember the political context 
in which it was written. "Separation of Powe ts" was one 
of the great driving forces behind progressive political 
theory in the second half of the 18th Century. Montes-
quieu had written, in "The Spirit of the Laws" that 
there could be no liberty when the executive and legis-
lative powers resided in the same person or body. 78 
Montesquieu was particularly concerned lest the power 
of raising money reside in the executive. 
This fear was reflected in Federalist No. 58 which 
emphasized the fact that the power of the purse was 
to reside in the representative of the people (the House) 
which could use it to reduce "all the overgrown prerog-
atives of the other branches of the government."79 
However, as important as this negative power was, the 
Federalist placed equal stress on the affirmative uses of 
the appropriations power. "The House of Representa-
tives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose, 
the supplies requisite for the support of government."80 
This affirmative aspect was emphasized in the Federalist: 
This power over the purse may, in fact, be 
regarded as the most complete and effectual 
weapon with which any constitution can arm 
the immediate representatives of the people for 
obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for 
carrying into effect every just and salutary 
measure.Bl 
With this background, it is now possible to examine the 
Constitution to see what guidance it gives in resolving 
the dispute. 
Any discussion of this issue must begin with the Con-
stitution's broad grants of power. "The Executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States ... "82 
There is no consensus as to exactly what the executive 
power is, but it is clear that, as Justice Douglas put it, 
"the power to execute the laws starts and ends with the 
laws Congress has enacted."83 Justice Douglas under-
scored this point by noting that the President's "power 
to recommend legislation ... serves only to emphasize 
that it is his function to recommend and that it is the 
function of Congress to legislate. " 84 Article I, Section 1 
of the Constitution explicitly states "All Legislative 
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of 
the United States." 
These broad statements, of course, have been undercut, 
compromised, and qualified by courts since Justice 
Marshall's day. 85 Though they do serve as useful points 
of departure, the complex issues of impoundment must 
be addressed by more specific Constitutional clauses. 
To support his claim that appropriations are basically 
permissive, Weinberger had cited Section 9 of Article I 
which sets forth a list of limitations on the government 
and particularly on Congress. More appropriate in 
resolving the impoundment question, however, is Sec-
tion 8 which lists the affirmative powers of Congress and 
which indicates for what purposes money might be 
drawn from the Treasury. 
Chief among the affirmative powers granted to Congress 
is that "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and 
excises, to pay the debts and provide for the Common 
Defense and General Welfare of the United States." This 
clause may be broken down into two powers. Explicitly, 
Congress is to have the taxing power; implicitly, Con-
gress is the branch of government given responsibility 
to provide for the common defense and the general 
welfare. As Jefferson wrote, "the laying of the taxes is 
the power and the general welfare the purpose for which 
the power is to be exercised."86 
If this clause is now coupled with the negative clause 
cited by Weinberger, "No money shall be drawn from 
the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations 
made by law ... ," an entirely different picture presents 
itself than the one painted by the Administration. No 
longer does the language cited by Weinberger appear to 
limit the meaning of an appropriation to a mere ceiling. 
Rather, in context with Section 8, Section 9 seems a 
clear limitation on the power of the President to make 
policy or establish priorities. The argument runs as 
follows: 1) Congress can provide for the common de-
fense and general welfare (through imposition of taxes); 
2) spending money is the chief means of so doing; 
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3) no money can be drawn from the Treasury except by 
Congress; 4) therefore, Congress is the only branch 
which can set spending priorities for the nation-in 
providing for the general welfare or common defense. 
If Congress is the branch specifically entrusted with 
setting priorities, then Weinberger's argument about 
the broad permissiveness of appropriations must fall for 
two reasons. First, it claims for the Executive an auth-
ority which was specifically denied by Section 9. 
Undoubtedly, the purpose of that clause was to prevent 
the Executive (or anyone else) from having the power 
to allocate the distribution of Federal monies. Under-
lying the phrase "no money shall be drawn" must be 
the concept "no spending priorities shall be set." 
Second, Weinberger's claim denigrates the affirmative 
power of Congress to provide for the general welfare 
and common defense. In construing the relevant clause, 
the Supreme Court has adhered to a broad definition 
which recognizes Congress's substantive power to appro-
priate, limited only by the requirement that such appro-
priations be made to provide for the general welfare.87 
In so ruling, the Court explicitly rejected the theory 
that the powers granted by the clause were limited by 
Congress's other enumerated powers. 88 If Congress's 
attempts to exercise this substantive power to provide 
for the general welfare (as embodied in appropriations) 
are deemed to be merely permissive, then the entire 
power is downgraded. They then do become merely 
"attempts to exercise" the power. In redefining the· 
presumptions concerning appropriations, the Adminis-
tration has, in effect, rewritten the Constitution to read: 
Congress shall have Power to lay and collect 
taxes ... to set the ceiling under which the 
Executive may provide for the common 
defense and general welfare. 89 
This interpretation of broad Congressional power and 
commensurately restricted Executive power in the field 
of policy-making and priority-setting for the nation is 
greatly enhanced by the "necessary and proper clause."90 
This final clause in Section 8 states that Congress shall 
have power: 
to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution the fore-
going powers, and all other powers vested by 
this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States or in any Department or Officer 
thereof. [Emphasis added.) 
The italicized portion of the clause makes it clear that 
Congress is not only empowered to make Jaws to exe-
cute its own enumerated powers, but it is also empow-
ered to make Jaws to regulate the execution of all 
powers vested in the Executive Department. An appro-
priation does more than academically declare a Con-
gressional policy; it also sets the scope and speed at 
which Congress wishes the policy implemented.91 Thus, 
any impou!ldment designed to modify a Congressional 
policy, or its scope and speed, is an Executive infringe-
ment on Congress's right to make laws regulating the 
execution of powers vested in the President. As Rehn-
quist asserted in his Justice Department memo, im-
poundment of funds for federally-impacted schools 
would constitute "defeat of the Congressional intent 
that the operations of these districts be funded at a 
particular level for the fiscal year."92 [Emphasis added.] 
3 Inherent Powers of the President 
It is in the area of inherent Presidential powers that the 
Administration makes its broadest claims for impound-
ment. It is here that the Administration paves its colli-
sion path with Congress. Deputy Attorney General 
Sneed asserted that the Congress could not prohibit the 
President from withholding funds nor could Congress 
turn to the courts.93 Weinberger was even more explicit, 
stating that someone has to decide whether the Presi-
dent is properly executing powers and authority which 
the Administration claims he possesses and "It is very 
important that the President himself reserve the right to 
make these decisions."94 These statements make clear 
that, however politely and deferentially the Administra-
tion will testify before Congress, in the final analysis, 
the President does claim the inherent right to impound-
regardless of Congress's dissent. 
The Administration case for inherent powers is based 
on specific and general Constitutional bases. Specifi-
cally, reliance is placed on the Commander-in-Chief 
power. More generally, the Administration claims the 
right under its broad management and executive func-
tions and under the "faithful execution of the laws" 
provision. Finally, the precedent of past presidential 
action is cited. Each claim will be considered in turn. 
The Commander-in-Chief Power 
Control of the armed forces is an excellent example of 
the doctrine of separation of powers. Fear of the pos-
sible abuses inherent in either branch fully controlling 
the military lead the Framers to divide the power 
between Congress and the President.95 Thus, "The 
President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
and Navy" (article II, sec. 2, cl. 1). However, Con-
gress is empowered_through Article I, section 8: 
To lay and collect taxes ... to ... provide for 
the common defense; 
To raise and support armies, but no appropri-
ation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer 
Term than two years; 
To provide and maintain a navy; 
To make rules for the Government and Regu-
lation of the land and Naval forces; and 
To make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper ... 
These provisions make clear that the military power is 
to be shared and that the power of the Commander-in-
Chief is limited by Congress's enumerated powers. 
Edward S. Corwin, a Constitutional scholar, has noted 
that the clauses of the Constitution giving Congress 
enumerated powers over the military were not inserted 
111 
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for the purpose of endowing the National Government 
with power to do these things "but rather to designate 
the department of Government which should exercise 
such powers."96 Lawrence Brady put the matter more 
simply, by noting that although there are no express 
limitations on the President's power as Commander-in-
Chief, "it should be remembered that he must first 
come to Congress to get an Army and Navy to com-
mand."97 
Despite the division of responsibility over military 
affairs set forth by the Constitution, the Administration 
has made a claim of tremendously strong authority. 
Weinberger said that a good legal case could be made 
for the proposition that the overriding powers that 
"have to go" with the authority of the Commander-in-
Chief "are such that they may well be in a separate 
category and that the powers incident to that authority 
are not subject to other powers or limitations in the 
Constitution. "98 Weinberger cites no authority for this 
broad statement and it seems clear that Constitutional 
construction would militate against it. No power was 
more feared by the Framers than that over the military. 
As noted, the power was carefully distributed between 
the two branches. In fact, Congress was specifically 
prohibited from delegating its powers to the President 
by the two-year limitation on military appropriations 
bills. Much of the motivation for placing the power of 
the purse in Congress was to put limitations on the 
President's military authority. And, of course, Con-
gress, not the President, was given the power to declare 
war. Given these factors, it is difficult to imagine how 
Weinberger could claim that the single-most feared and 
carefully circumscribed power was intended to be 
beyond "other powers or limitations in the Constitu-
tion." 
It is not sufficient to assert that the military power is 
shared between the two branches. More important is 
the attempt to describe the exact lines of division. 
Implicit in the different grants of power is the idea that 
the President shall be the tactical and strategic com-
mander of the forces which Congress shall provide, 
maintain and regulate.99 Thus, the President has the 
general power to direct the military in its operations 
but Congress, through the appropriations power, 
decides how large, well-equipped, etc. the military is to 
be, as well as which weapons systems are to be pro-
cured or not. 
This division of power was explicitly recognized in the 
Federalist which stated that the Commander-in-Chiefs 
power "would amount to nothing more than the su-
preme command and direction of the military and 
naval forces ... " 100 Furthermore, the Courts have also 
addressed the problem. In McBlair v. United States, the 
Court stated that Congress has the right to legislate for 
the army as long as it does not impair the President's 
efficiency as Commander-in-Chief and when a law is 
passed, withirt that qualification, the President "be-
comes as to that law an executive officer, and is limited 
in the discharge of his duty by the statute." 101 
This statement poses the centra,l issue in the dispute 
over the Commander-in-Chief function. The President 
has a tremendous amount of flexibility in exercising 
these powers. Deference to the role of supreme com-
mander is shared by most members of Congress and by 
the nation as a whole. In emergencies or during war, 
this deference soars. However, the power to regulate 
and equip the armed forces rests in Cbngress. Con-
gressional action in these areas of proper responsibility 
necessarily preempts any inherent powers the President 
might otherwise have. Certainly, the right to make 
decisions embracing the equipment, size and nature of 
the armed forces is a Congressional power, subject only 
to Presidential recommendation or veto. 102 
In the field of appropriations, it may be argued that 
Congress has affirmatively acted to establish its right to 
determine the size and equipment of the armed forces. 
In 1949, Congress amended the National Security Act 
of 194 7 and recognized the right of Service Secretaries 
and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to by-pass the 
President (and BOB) to make recommendations con-
cerning their budget needs on their own initia_tive and 
directly to Congress. As Brady pointed out, the mili-
tary will inevitably desire more funds than the Presi-
dent is willing to approve. Hence, their right to appeal 
directly to Congress" becomes a nullity unless Con-
gress also possesses the right to act upon their appeal." 103 
In short, the inherent power a President possesses as 
Commander-in-Chief does not include the right to with-
hold monies appropriated by Congress for the armed 
forces. 
Broad Claims of Inherent Power 
Justifications based on the Commander-in-Chief theory 
are quite specific compared to the broad claims of 
inherent power which have been advanced by various 
Administrations. In 1967, the Director of the Budget 
Bureau was asked about the legal authority to impound. 
He replied, "Basically, it is the general power of the 
President to operate for the welfare of the economy 
and the Nation in terms of combatting inflationary 
pressures." 104 Weinberger referred to "the Constitu-
tional provisions which vest the executive power in the 
President" and the "general management power" of the 
Executive. 105 And most recently, Sneed succinctly said 
"We rest on Articles I, II and III!"106 
These broad claims rest on two basic premises. The first 
is simply the need for someone to be able to act on an 
efficient, day-to-day basis because of the cumbersome-
ness of Congress. This need necessarily entails the Pres-
ident being able to make policy decisions. 107 The second 
premise is that the President must faithfully execute all 
the·laws, including some which may be mutually incon-
sistent.108 This, too, necessarily involves discretion and 
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policy-making since the President must decide how to 
resolve the conflict. 
The arguement based on faithful execution was dis-
cussed in the "Conflicting Statutory Authority" section 
of this paper. Briefly to recapitulate, it was found that 
for the argument to be persuasive, there must be: 
an objective, as opposed to manufac-
tured, conflict in Congressional laws, 
2 the conflict must be "real and immi-
nent" and 
3 there must not be any less drastic reme-
dies available. 
If any of these factors is not present, the Executive 
cannot claim legitimate conflicting authority to justify 
impoundment. 
The issues involved in the first premise have been argued 
and decided by the Supreme Court in the Steel Seizure 
Case. 100 This decision, though not based on an impound-
men t controversy, has been called by Professor Bickel 
"the principle statement of the relationship between 
Congress and the President where powers are inherent." 
The case arose when President Truman ordered the 
seizure of steel mills to prevent a nation-wide strike of 
steel workers. The action occurred in 1952 during the 
Korean War. The mills were seized and the President 
promptly informed Congress, which took no action. 
In its brief the government did not argue that the sei-
zure was based on specific statutory authority. Rather, 
it cited "the aggregate of (the President's) ... consti-
tutional powers as the Nation's Chief Executive and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces ... " 110 This 
broad claim of inherent power was rejected by a 6-3 
majority of the Court. The decision was badly splint-
ered, with 5 concurring opinions; however, a consensus 
was reached by 6 justices as to one crucial issue. Though 
the President may have some inherent powers in the 
absence of Congressional action in a particular field, 
once Congress does act, those powers are necessarily 
preempted. If Congress has proper authority to legislate 
in an area, that legislation defines the limits of Presi-
dential action. Justice Jackson formulated the principle 
of the Court: 
When the President takes measures incom-
patible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for 
then he can rely only upon his own consti-
tutional powers minus any constitutional-
powers of Congress over the matter. Courts 
can sustain exclusive presidential control in 
such a case only by disabling the Congress 
from acting upon the subject.111 
In examining the statutes dealing with labor disputes, 
the Court found that granting to the President the 
power to seize property, though considered, had been 
rejected by Congress. 112 Congress had thus set the 
limits under which the President was forced to act. 
The opinion of the Court is directly relevant to a con-
sideration of the President's inherent powers in the 
impoundment area. In certain respects, the seizure was 
more justifiable than impoundment: 
The seizure 0ccurred in the midst of a 
war when a steel strike could have had 
a serious, detrimental effect on the 
national defense. 
2 The action was a temporary, ad hoc 
executive response to an emergency 
situation, unlike the routine use of 
impoundment. 
The appropriations power is clearly within the scope of 
Congressional authority. Thus, any Congressional action 
which limits impoundment precludes inherent Presi-
dential power to act otherwise. Congress has acted to 
limit impoundment through the passage of the revised 
Antideficiency Act. As previously noted, the Act per-
mits reservations of funds for only two purposes: 
l to provide for contingencies and 
2 to effect savings. 
Furthermore, the House Report accompanying the Act 
was explicitly clear that though savings were to be 
effected, "there is no warrant or justification for the 
thwarting of a major policy of Congress by ... im-
pounding ... " 113 Thus, the Steel Seizure Case coupled 
with the Antideficiency Act precludes impoundment 
for policy reasons. As Professor Bickel stated: 
I read the Antideficiency Act with its legis-
lative history ... as being the assumption by 
Congress of its residual power in this area. I 
read it as mandatory ... and I read it as 
telling the Executive in what circumstances 
he can establish reserves ... my professional 
puzzlement as a lawyer is why is this section 
... not the decisive answer? Why does any-
body go to this problem with anything before 
him but this document?ll4 
It was precisely this analysis that the Budget Bureau 
officials, opposed to the Antideficiency Act, feared. 
Two years before the Steel Seizure Case, they recog-
nized that having Congress statutorily recognize and 
define the impoundment authority would reduce 
rather than secure the power.115 
Precedent to Justify Inherent Powers 
It is difficult to address the argument concerning the 
role of past presidential action as a justification for 
impoundment because the Administration seems to 
shift ground in presenting its claim. On one hand, 
Weinberger points to the long history of Presidential 
action and interpretation of powers as an important 
authority. He immediately qualifies this by adding that 
Congress has the ability to override the decisions if they 
are contrary to its wiJJ.116 Later, however, he makes the 
blanket assertion that it is important that the President 
himself must decide whether his actions are proper 
113 
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exercises of his powers.117 This would seem to preclude 
Congress reversing the action. Reconciling all the 
available data indicates that the basic premise in this 
regard is that Presidential interpretation and actions, 
in determining the executive's definition of its office 
may s~rve as an independent ground for supporting ' 
impoundment. 
The argument of previous Presidential action as legiti-
mizing authority for current action was raised by the 
government in defense of the steel seizure. Justice 
Black, writing for the Court, rejected this claim: 
It is said that other Presidents without Con-
gressional authority have taken possession of 
private business enterprises in order to settle 
labor disputes. But even if this be true, Con-
gress has not thereby lost its exclusive 
constitutional authority to make laws neces-
ary and proper to carry out the powers vested 
by the Constitution 'in the Government of the 
United States, or any Department or officer 
thereof. 118 
The analogy to the impoundment controversy is ines-
capable-both as to past Congressional limitations of 
the power (the Antideficiency Act Revision) or to 
prospective limitations on the power. Congress clearly 
has the power to modify, reduce or terminate any 
presidential power to impound-regardless of what 
Presidents in the past have done. 
Finally, in considering the overall question of precedent, 
one must rei:nember that, like a double-edged sword, 
it cuts both ways. The Administration has cited one 
example after another of Presidential use or defense of 
impoundment. However, the Administration has not 
discussed the legislative history of the Antideficiency 
Act, the BOB's restrictive view of impoundment, or 
other equally important "precedents." 
Evaluation of the Constitutional Issues 
Because no Constitutional provision and no Supreme 
Court decision is directly on point, the Constitutional 
issue cannot be resolved in any blanket statement. What 
can be done is to weigh the arguements pro and con, 
consider the relevant cases and Constitutional text, 
and attempt to draw the fairest conclusions based on 
this analysis. On each count, the balance falls in favor 
of the Administration's right to reserve funds for 
statutorily-approved reasons but heavily against the 
Administration's right to impound for policy reasons. 
The spending of money is an executive function, but 
coupled with the requirement that the laws be faith-
fully executed, the Administration is estopped from 
selectively enforcing only those laws of which it ap-
proves. Congress's right to pass laws, under the neces-
ary and proper clause, which regulate the President's 
execution of his powers is another important limitation 
on Presidential prerogatives in this area. 
The Administration claim that appropriations, as dis-
tinguished from all other laws, are permissive unless 
otherwise stated is a deprecation of the affirmative 
powers of Congress set forth in Section 8 'and an 
attempt to circumvent the clear limitation on Execu-
tive policy-making which is emf:iodied in Section 9 
(allowing no one but Congress to allocate Federal funds 
from the Treasury and, implicitly, to set spending 
priorities). Furthermore, it creates a form of item veto 
which is difficult, if not impossible, to override. The 
veto granted by the Constitution was carefully restricted. 
It was to be neither an item veto, nor an absolute 
veto. 119 The fact that the President, through impound-
ment, can exercise a power of item veto which was 
explicitly denied him by the Constitution may serve as 
an independent basis for invalidating the practice on 
Constitutional grounds.120 
Claims for impoundment based on the aggregate of the 
Commander-in-Chief function similarly must fall. The 
Constitution clearly divides the power oyer military 
affairs between the two branches and places policy-
making for the provision of the armed forces in Con-
gressional hands. Furthermore, the Steel Seizure Case 
repudiated this notion of inherent Commander-in-Chief 
powers at least in those cases where Congress has 
asserted its residual powers through legislation. 
The Steel Seizure Case stands for the proposition that 
once Congress passes legislation in an area of its proper 
responsibility, any broad inherent powers which the 
Executive might otherwise claim are necessarily re-
stricted by the Congressional enactment. The Anti-
deficiency Act constitutes the Congressional assump-
tion of responsibility in its clear area of prerogative: 
the spending of funds. Taken with its legislative history, 
the Act permits reservation of funds for contingencies 
and to effect savings but precludes impoundment for 
policy reasons. 
In short, the necessary and proper clause, the Anti-
deficiency Act, the Steel Seizure Case ·and the faithful 
execution clause combine to set the constitutional 
limits on impoundment. Taken together, they present 
an extremely strong case against the practice of im-
poundment to effect policy changes. 
To some, this may be unfortunate. Given the complex-
ities and scope of modern government, the increasing 
need to control spending and the proven irresponsibility 
of Congress121 in fiscal matters, impoundment looks 
like a very desirable and efficient device. However, as 
Justice Brandeis pointed out, the "doctrine of separa-
tion of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, 
not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise 
of arbitrary power."122 
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V Abuse Through Impoundment: Thwarting Congress to 
Achieve Presidential Policy Objectives 
The foregoing discussion has attempted to draw 
the line between the legitimate and illegitimate withhold-
ing of funds. Absent a truly inflexible spending or debt 
ceiling, the President is acting within his statutory and 
Constitutional authority only when funds are withheld 
to meet specific contingencies within a program or to 
effect savings within a program. Savings may be effected 
only if the full amount of service mandated by Congress 
can be provided for less than anticipated originally. In 
making decisions to withhold funds, Congress's intent, 
not the President's desires or beliefs, must be controlling. 
Despite these limits, the Nixon record of impoundment 
reveals an unparalleled disregard and contempt for the 
will of Congress. Congressional programs not favored by 
the Administration are simply dispensed with. Frequent 
use of impoundment is having a wide impact, previously 
unknown. The President has imposed broad priority shifts 
on Congress. Large numbers of programs are being termi-
nated, rather than merely deferred, in a dangerous new 
departure of the practice. Such terminations are occurring 
regularly, whenever the President unilaterally decides that 
particular programs are not effective or efficient. Given 
the absence of specified and fixed criteria to measure 
"effectiveness", the President is able to exercise carte 
blanche in making these determinations. These abuses 
have all been magnified by the Executive department's 
use of duplicitous devices to shield its acts from Con-
gressional and public scrutiny. 
Dispensing with Unfavored Programs 
In the past, foreign wars were generally the occasions for 
impoundment. However during the Nixon Administration, 
the overriding source for impoundment has been a domes-
tic war - that between the Congress and President over 
differing policies. Congressman Henry Gonzalez of Texas 
has pointed out that "we have had, of course, more vetoes 
and more vetoes overriden within the last 30 months than 
we had in the prior administrations of three different 
Presidents"123 
When vetoes are made and overriden with this frequency, 
two facts readily become apparent. Most obvious is that 
there are vastly differing priorities held by the two 
branches. This sets the climate for policy-motivated im-
poundment. 
But more significantly, vetoes and overrides on this scale 
are evidence of a loss of trust and respect between the 
President and Congress. This removes the constraints 
from policy impoundment. 
Lack of trust, in and of itself, is certainly not inimical. In 
fact, separation of powers is enhanced by a healthy dis-
trust of the other branches. However, when that distrust 
is coupled with an unhealthy lack of respect, there is a 
serious danger that one branch will usurp whatever 
powers its political muscle is strong enough to seize and 
maintain. At such times, the Constitution may be viewed 
more as an obstacle to be overcome than as a code of re-
strictions to be adhered to. 124 
At the present it is the Executive branch which is on the 
offensive and which is usurping the powers of the other 
branch. The power of Congress to establish governmental 
policies and to order priorities through legislation is being 
dangerously undermined. 
The Administration is making no secret of its disregard 
for Congressional spending policy. One of the better ver-
bal examples was provided by the President himself. Play-
ing the role of the stern parent, he scolded Congress by 
saying: "But if you are going to have responsibility, you 
have to be responsible, and Congress ... has not been re-
sponsible on money."125 The implication is that if Con-
gress does not behave "responsibly," its appropriations 
powers will be taken away. Because the Constitution ap-
parently did not foresee this particular need, there has 
been no branch of government specifically entrusted with 
the power of deciding whether Congress has acted 
maturely. 
In the interim, the Administration has filled the vacuum. 
When it has decided that either specific programs were 
undesirable or that broad-range priorities were misplaced, 
it has used impoundment to redress the problem. As John 
Ehrlichman put it "does the President just abandon com-
mon sense when he knows better?" (emphasis added)126 
A good example of this common sense approach occurred 
in fiscal 1971 when Congress and the Administration dif-
fered on the use of categorical grants to promote water 
and sewer facilities projects.127 Congress had initially ap-
propriated $500 million for the projects. The President 
vetoed the bill. Thereafter, Congress passed a $350 mil-
lion appropriation which became law. The President still 
felt that this amount was being misplaced so impound-
ment as a "second veto" was used and $200 million was 
frozen. Congressman Zablocki wrote to OMB officials to 
voice his concern. 
The OMB reply came from Caspar Weinberger who told 
Zablocki that: 
... the President firmly believes that revenue-
sharing represents a.much more effective way of 115 
helping local governments ... than the na"owly 
focused categorical programs which now exist. 
(Emphasis added) 
Weinberger then explained why the Administration favored 
revenue-sharing and concluded by stating that some of 
the categorical grant programs would continue to be 
funded, "to facilitate transition to general and special 
revenue-sharing." 
Similar reasons were cited for withholding funds from 
urban renewal, Model Cities, low-rent public housing and 
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other urban programs. Testifying before a Senate Com-
mittee, HUD Secretary George Romney explained that . 
funds were being withheld from these areas because there 
was no point in accelerating programs which were "sched-
uled for termination." 128 
What Romney did not explain was, simply, scheduled by . 
whom? Congress had neither passed a revenue-sharing 
bill nor indicated that there was "no point in accelerat-
ing" categorical grant programs. On the contrary, its re-
fusal to do so was what had led to the impoundments. 
If Congress had passed a revenue-sharing law at the time, 
the Administration could have offered a colorable argu-
ment that it would be inefficient to continue funding of 
the categorical grants.129 But unilaterally deciding which 
form of program is preferable is a clear abrogation of legis-
lative authority. Furthermore, revenue-sharing would 
have to be equivalent in amount of service provided, for 
this argument to be persuasive. Mayor Richard Hatcher 
of Gary, Ind., .has estimated that the current revenue-
sharing will bring his city less than 40% of what individual 
Federal grants amounted to in 1972.130 
At best, the Administration was guilty of a high degree 
of presumption in assuming revenue-sharing would be en-
acted and would be intended to supplant categorical aid. 
However, at the time in question ( 1971 ), the New York 
Times reported that "The Mayors are doubtful that Con-
gress will enact the Nixon (revenue-sharing) Proposal." 131 
This raises the possibility that the impoundments were 
a form of political blackmail with the Administration 
saying in effect, that the funds for the various urban 
projects would only be made available in the form of 
revenue-sharing. Congressional opponents of revenue-
sharing would then be given the Hobson's choice of ap-
proving the Nixon proposal or seeing the cities denied 
the needed funds. 132 
The political blackmail possibility is increased by the fact 
that when Congress has not acted in accord with Admin-
istration "expectations", the President's actions have not 
been any different. A recent example, reported by the 
New York Times, entailed the gradual elimination of 
emergency employment assistance, a public employment 
program designed to provide temporary work during the 
recent period of high unemployment.133 The President's 
197 4 budget delegates the functions of manpower projects 
to the state and local levels where the option to rekindle 
the programs will be left. This may sound like a replay 
of the Administration arguments for impounding urban 
funds because of the pendency of revenue-sharing. How-
ever, in this case, such pendency cannot be claimed as a 
rationale. As the Times observed: 
In effect, President Nixon is now creating a 
manpower revenue-sharing by administrative 
action that is similar to a program that Congress 
failed to act on legislatively. (emphasis added) 
The revenue-sharing cases might be interpreted as a Presi-
dential attempt to cut through the status quo and force 
Congress to update its programs. However, impoundment 
has been used in reverse: to prevent shifts from the status 
quo. 
Prior to food stamps, rural poor were fed through a com-
modity-distribution program.134 However, this arrange-
ment proved unsatisfactory. The Senate Select Committee 
on Nutrition and Human Needs had outlined the pro-
gram's shortcomings. As Timothy Ingram noted, the main 
problem was that this method was designed 
more to absorb farm surplus and keep farm prices 
up than to feed the hungry. The result is insuffi-
cient food, nutritional imbalance, dangerous 
shortage conditions and red tape. 135 
Because of these problems, Congress decided to switch to 
food stamps to feed the poor. Nevertheless, in many areas 
food stamps were simply unavailable: OMB had impounded 
$200 million of the funds. 
What is clearly going on is not merely an executive at-
tempt to promote the most efficient programs in each 
area. Rather, it is the President's attempt to promote the 
programs which he finds philosophically or politically 
most desirable in each area. This much has been privately 
admitted by the Administration. A high-ranking OMB 
official confidentially told the National Journal in 1971: 
"Take urban renewal and model cities ($783 million im-
pounded at the time), Nixon doesn't believe in {the pro-
! . ,,136 grams). Draw your own cone us1ons. 
Not surprisingly, the 1974 budget served notice that these 
and other urban programs disliked by the President would 
be terminated. After July 1, HUD will approve "no new 
projects for urban renewal, Model Cities, open space, 
neighborhood facilities, water and sewer systems, rehab-
ilitation loans and public facility loans."137 
The New York Times reports that survival of these pro-
grams, after their unexpended funds are exhausted, 
"would depend on whether Congress enacts the President's 
special revenue-sharing plan for community develop-
ment.138 
Sweeping terminations such as these raise the inevitable 
question of how impoundment decisions are made by the 
President and the OMB. In a confidential interview (Aug-
ust, 1972), a high-ranking OMB official gave a candid 
answer.139 He listed four criteria which are em ployed: 
The programs involved is "ineffective" or "im-
properly functioning"; 
2 The program is philosophically objectionable. 
As an example, he suggested " ... it's a welfare 
program and we should change the e~tire pro-
gram to discourage people from staying on wel-
fare"; 
3 A Jlending program is supposed to replace ~he 
program in question. His example was the im-
poundments of HUD funds in anticipation of 
revenue-sharing. 
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4 Congress appropriates more funds for a program 
than the President's budget request calls for 
(termed "add-ons"). "Obviously, when we must 
impound, we do it to the add-ons". 
Examining these four items reveals how completely the 
President has seized the legislative power to set spending 
priorities. Items #2 and #4 indicate that impoundment 
decisions are often based on pure Presidential desires. 
I terns# 1 and #3 grant broad justifications to scrap virtu-
ally any program. 
The President has demanded for himself the power to 
define the "effectiveness" and the "efficiency" of pro-
grams.140 The power to define, no less than the power to 
tax, is ultimately the power to destroy. Congress's dis-
agreement with the President's assessments is evidenced 
by its continual funding of the programs in question.141 
Congressional disagreement with Presidential assessments 
is especially significant when the question of add-ons is 
considered. Nowhere else is disdain of Congress more evi-
dent. By definition, add-ons are only made when Con-
gress and the President differ on a budgetary matter. They 
are also made only after the Congress has considered the 
President's requests and heard testimony from the affected 
agencies. Because agency heads are constrained from de-
parting from the President's recommendations,142 and 
because Congress usually shows a great deference for 
those recommendations,143 the deck is already stacked 
largely in the President's favor. When the President is 
given the power to impound, his control of spending be-
comes virtually complete. 
Impoundments in Urban Sector 
This table lists impoundments of major housing and transit 
programs for fiscal 1971. Program backlog is the total de-
mand for funds for approved programs and does not in-
clude pending applications. Unmet demand is the differ-
ence between program backlog and the Nixon Adminis-
tration's spending plans. In most cases, the Nixon budget 
and the funds withheld add up to the appropriation. In 
the case of model cities, however, the Administration 
now plans to spend more than the $375 million it bud-
geted; thus, the budget figure and the amount withheld 




Urban renewal $1,200 $1,000 
Model cities 1,107 375 
Water and sewer 350 15.0 
Public housing 320 128 
Mass transit 600 269t 
Total $3,577 $1,922 
An illustration of this totality is provided by the following 
table which appeared in the National Journal. Though the 
table only deals with urban impoundments, it is indica-
tive of the general treatment of Congressional add-ons. 
The first three columns reveal that it is the President's 
budget, not Congressional appropriations, which deter-
mines the amount of funds spent. Given the "unmet de-
mand" and "program backlog," Congress apparently did 
appropriate in a discriminating and responsible manner.144 
Nevertheless, every time Congress attempted to alter the 
President's "request," the full amount of that alteration 
was withheld.145 There was apparently no Congressional 
input, via the appropriations process in any of these spend-
ing decisions. 
Furthermore, Administration statements make clear that 
no change in this practice should be expected if Congress 
attempts to alter the current budget proposai.146 It is for 
these reasons that the President's budget proposal is con-
sidered less a proposal than a "final offer." 
A good illustration was the termination of a project to 
build a national aquarium in Washington. At a time of in-
flationary pressure and limited resources, many saw the 
Aquarium's $10 million cost as a needless luxury. Fur-
thermore, a number of people on Capital Hill have admitted 
that the appropriation was passed more as a favor or sign 
of respect for its chief sponsor, Congressman Kirwan, 
than because of the pressing need for a Washington 
Aquarium. 
*-Approximately SO per cent of initial applications and 30 per 
cent of initial program budgets were approved for model cities 
program. Few, if any, additional cities are to be designated 
under pending fiscal 1972 budget. 
#- $465 million of the total backlog is listed as active backlog for 
fiscal 19 71. 
:f:- Excluding model cities. 
t- Capital grants only. The total Administration budget for mass 
transit is $400 million. 
SOURCE: Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs 
with- program unmet 
held backlog demand 
$ 200 $2,756 $1,756 
583 • • 
200 2,500# 2,350 
192 560 432 
200 l,OOot 73lt 
$1,375 $6,816* $5,269:t 
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The aquarium, for all its doubtful importance, did carry 
with it a duly enacted ap~ropriation couhced in manda-
tory spending language. 7 Nevertheless, the Administra-
tion terminated the project. 148 
In response to a charge that policy-making rather than 
fiscal management was entailed, Caspar Weinberger 
replied: 
Well, the Administration has decided not to fund 
the project and thereby, certainly, given Congress 
another opportunity to consider the relative im-
portance of the fish in this particular fiscal year. l49 
(emphasis added) 
Elsewhere, Weinberger indicated that based on the rela-
tive priorities, the termination was a good decision. 
The fact that Weinberger was probably correct in his as-
sessment raises the central issue of policy impoundment. 
There are basically two types of disdain which the Ad-
ministration can show for Congress. The first is a con-
tempt for Congressional actions, priorities, judgments, 
etc. Preference for revenue-sharing over categorical grants 
or for termination of the aquarium fall within this cate-
gory. The Administration has every right to feel contempt 
at this level. · · 
However, the second level of disdain is far more serious. 
This is disdain of Congress as an institution. Thwarting 
programs, repealing laws, ignoring directives, fall in this 
category. It is when "feelings" of disdain manifest them-
selves in "actions" of disdain that a real threat to the 
Constitutional separation of powers emerges. 
According to America's doctrine of rule by laws, the 
average citizen has the right to rant, rave or rage at the 
actions of Congress, but not the right to ignore laws on 
the grounds of disagreements. The Administration has 
the same right coupled with the same obligation. 
Broad Scale Impact of Impoundment 
Although impoundment has existed as a serious Presiden-
tial policy tool since Roosevelt's time, the level of criti-
cism has never been deeper or harsher. The reason is that 
critics of Nixon policy-impoundment feel that it differs in 
kind rather than degree from past practice. Explaining the 
greater amount of criticism which has been directed at 
N~on, Congressman Pickle observed that in the past, "the 
ma1or cases were isolated and sporadic". He continued: 
"recently, however, the use of impoundment by OMB has 
developed into a tool of broad policy legislation.1so 
For reasons to be discussed below, there is insufficient 
data with which to compare Nixon impoundment quan-
titatively with past practice (See "Absence of Fixed Cri-
teria" section). However, there is a strong feeling that the 
practice differs qualitatively for three reasons: I) basic 
spending priorities have been drastically altered; 2) there 
has been a more direct adverse effect on many citizens 
than under previous impoundments; 3) termination rather 
than deferral has become more common. 
Altering Priorities: Domestic Cuts to Pay for Defense 
"The only casualties in the war 'On inflation are still 
civilian"151 
In the recent Nixon budget it was decided that the nation 
could not afford $384 million to continue support of the 
Community Action Program. However, when Budget 
Director Robert P. Mayo once questioned Defense Secre-
tary Laird about the need for a $300 million item in the 
defense budget, the irritated Secretary snapped back: 
"For heaven's sake, stop nickel-and-diming me to death." 
Nothing could better illustrate where the Nixon Admin-
istration places its priorities. 
T~e.President has every right to believe in whatever pri-
onhes he chooses. However, in recent years Congress has 
evidenced differing views of the needs of the nation. 
Through impoundment the President has been able to en-
sure that his views prevailed. 
Any discussion of priority-shifting must begin with the 
frank recognition that most of the budget is "uncontrol-
lable" in that past legislation has created obligations 
which must be met. For instance, interest on the public 
debt must be paid, whatever the costs, on the previously 
established rates. Similarly, many programs are open-
ended in that all qualifying claims must be paid, regard-
less of other limits. Among these programs are Social 
Security, Medicare, military retirement, Veterans Bene-
fits, and certain public assistance grants. In 1971, two-
thirds of the budget was uncontrollable.152 And President 
Nixon's 1974 budget sets the uncontrollable figure at 
75%.153 
What this, of course means is that Congress, through ap-
propriations, and the President, through the budget, can 
only establish their respective spending programs by 
juggling 25% of the budget. Relatively few decisions will 
determine spending priorities for a given year. Therefore, 
in considering the policy consequences of impoundments, 
one must calculate the effects on the relatively small 
"controllable" portion of the budget rather than on the 
overall budget figure. 
In 1971, an OMB official told the National Journal that 
the President only had a "fringe at the top" to establish 
his Administration's program: 154 
Once Nixon decided he did not want to cut the de-
fense budget any more - that's where the real 
money is - there was very little room for us to 
play with, to get his program in and stay within 
a predetermined ceiling of $229 billion. 
Of course, the statement reveals that within the "fringe" 
bro~d discretion was exercised. Louis Fisher pointed out 
the extent of this policy determination by carefully anal-
yzing budget and impoundmen t fig1ues for 1971. Noting 
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that impoundments can only be made in the "control-
lable" portions of the budget, Fisher calculated the De-
fense Department's (DOD) share of the controllable bud-
get and its share of impounded figures. Although its share 
of the controllables was 76%, its share of impoundments 
was only 10.5%. Fisher concluded: 
If DOD is underrepresented in the area of im-
pounded funds, domestic programs are neces-
sarily overrepresented and must bear the brunt 
of the burden. 155 
While massive cuts were being made in Congress's social 
programs in order to fight inflation, the President was re-
questing additional funds for B-1 Bombers, SST's, Trident 
Submarines, Safeguard Missiles and other such programs. 156 
One Congressman was particularly galled by the fact that 
although funds for loans to small farmers were cut, loans 
for Lockheed were advocated by the Administration.157 
Clearly, Congress and the President held strongly differ-
ing views of broad questions of national policy. Through 
impoundment, the dispute was resolved in favor of Presi-
dential control of such decisions. Priority shifts on this 
massive scale are a new departure in the long history of 
impoundment.158 
Adverse Effects on Broad Numbers of Citizens 
Another unique aspect of Nixon impoundments has been 
equally responsible for much of the acrimonious criticism 
which has been heard. Except during the height of war, 
never have so many citizens been as directly and adversely 
affected by the practice. In the past, most cuts have gen-
erally come from the defense budget or highway trust 
funds. Though these projects have their ardent supporters, 
cuts in the Nike-Zeus or Polaris programs have not had 
as disastrous an effect as cuts made in health, poverty, 
housing and similar social programs. As Timothy Ingram 
noted, "It is hard not to agree with Senator Percy, who 
can give up a little Congressional power to stop the high-
ways, but can find such a loss unacceptable when it comes 
to food stamps.159 
Of course, an impoundment purist would be equally 
aghast at the withholding of funds for highways or for 
needed medical care. But most people, including mem-
bers of Congress, are not that objective and many of the 
following cuts undoubtedly flamed the fires of anti-
impoundment feelings. 
Over 90 members of Congress signed a strong Jetter of 
protest to President Nixon in 1970 when it was discov-
ered that approximately $3 million(including a $2 million 
supplemental appropriation) had been withheld from the 
Indian Health Care Program. The letter noted that as a 
result, Indian hospitals were being "forced to close wards, 
refuse admissions, curtail surgery, postpone elective but 
necessary medical care, and discontinue immunization 
shots to children" .160 The full implications of these cuts 
were revealed in an exchange between Congresswoman 
Hansen and a doctor testifying before a House Appropri-
ations committee: 
Mrs. Hansen: On contract medical care, assum-
ing the provision for increased cost is sufficient 
to maintain the current level, what percentage 
of your program are you now reaching with the 
funds you have? 
Dr. Rabeau: At the present time, we are reach-
ing between 60 and 70 percent of the total need. 
Mrs. Hansen: Isn't it true that when you lack 
funds in this area, before recommending care for 
one person or another, it could involve the de-
cision of whether one person will die or live? 
Dr. Rabeau: This actually very often happens, 
Madam Chairman, that a physician has to make 
a judgment.because of limited funds."161 
An equally strong Jetter was sent by a group of Senators 
to express deep concern that the Emergency Food and 
Medical Services program administered by O.E.O' (Office 
of Economic Opportunity) was being "arbitrarily dis-
solved" by the OMB. After citing strong indications of 
continued Congressional support for the program (includ-
ing a Supplemental Appropriation "directing" expendi-
ture of the funds),162 the Jetter enumerated some of the 
results of termination: 
Termination ... would jeopardize the nutri-
tional status of a specially vulnerable group: 
pregnant women, new mothers and young 
infants ... ; 
Termination would affect experimental group 
feeding programs for the elderly poor; 
Termination would mean the end of the only 
extensive experimentation underway in the uses 
of the mass media to provide nutritional edu-
cation; 
funds being made available ... to transport food 
commodities to eligible but homebound elderly 
poor ... would no longer be available. 163 
Termination Rather Than Defe"al 
The third new dimension of impoundment has been added 
by the increasing use of termination rather than deferral 
of projects. Although "mere" deferrals can often spell 
life and death, as with the cuts in the Indian Health Pro-
gram, termination is obviously much more serious. 
Even during periods of intense national crisis, Congress 
has only sanctioned defe"al of projects. At the outset of 
World War II, President Roosevelt explicitly said "During 
this period of national emergency, it seems appropriate 
to defer construction projects that interfere with the de-
fense program by diverting manpower and materials" .164 
(emphasis added) His added reference to the desirability 
of establishing "a reservoir of post-defense projects to 
help absorb labor that later will be released by defense 
industry" serves only to underline that the impound-
ments were temporary .165 
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The lesson from history is clear: if even during the height 
of war, the President has been expected to postpone 
rather than terminate projects, terminations made during 
peacetime are that much more odious.166 
In the absence of all-out war, impoundment in recent 
years has derived most of its justification as an anti-
inflation device. During inflationary periods, even the 
President's right to unilaterally defer expenditures is 
questionable. There is no question, however, that he can-
not termiilate programs because of inflation. 
Nevertheless, under the cloak of inflationary pressures, 
the Nixon administration has been unilaterally announc-
ing the termination of a broad range of social projects. As 
previously noted, no new projects for urban renewal, 
Model Cities, open space, neighborhood facilities, water 
and sewer systems, and other urban projects will be 
"approved" .167 Senator Ervin has noted the termination 
of several agricultural programs, including the rural en-
vironmental assistance program and emergency disaster 
loans to farmers. 168 
Other social areas are receiving the same treatment. While 
proposing a subsidy, in the form of tax credits, to parents 
sending their children to private or parochial schools, 
President Nixon "proposes the elimination of dozens of 
popular education programs" .169 This is less a proposal 
than an order because parts of these programs are to be 
shifted to revenue-sharing. There has been considerable 
Congressional resistance to educational revenue-sharing 
and, according to the New York Times, "most legislators 
influential in education matters doubt that the Nixon 
proposal will become law this year." 170 Nevertheless, 
"Caspar Weinberger ... threatened that money might not 
be made available for continuation of the programs in 
their current format if revenue-sharing was not enacted. "171 
(emphasis added) 
In more general terms, OMB's new director Roy L. Ash 
has confirmed that President Nixon will strive to reduce 
the number of Federal employees year by year.1 72 Ac-
·cording to the Times, "the reductions will be sought by 
the abolition of Federal programs and agencies ... " 173 
Nowhere is fhis more apparent than in the current dis-
mantling of the Office of Economic Opportunity (O.E.O.). 
Though certain OEO functions are to be delegated to 
other agencies, some functions are to be undermined or 
destroyed. The most notable termination is the Commu-
nity Action Program (CAP), considered the heart of the 
"War on Poverty". Under its umbrella, a wide range of 
employment, health, and other anti-poverty programs 
were co-ordinated.174 While CAP is to be outrightly abol-
. ished, another OEO offshoot, the Office of Legal Services, 
is slated for emasulation. The President has called for 
abolition of the present system with legal services to be 
funded through a private corporation. The corporation 
would decentralize the program and allow state and local 
governments to determine its future direction. Of course, 
it is precisely these governments who have been the vic-
tims of many legal service lawsuits. Furthermore, if 
revenue-sharing actions are any indication, there is a 
strong danger that Congress will have the 'choice of either 
accepting the Nixon proposal O! seeing the legal services 
money denied. Continued funding of the present system 
faces the full range of Presidential opposition (vetoes, 
impoundments, harassment, etc.). 
The grounds for termination of these programs are quite 
illuminating. The New York Times notes that apparently 
inconsistent reasons were given in the budget for the 
abolition of the Community Action Program.175 The 
main budget volume claims that community action con-
cepts have now been "successfully incorporated into on-
going programs and local agencies." However, the more 
detailed budget appendix says that the program was being 
terminated because of its failure. And an OMB official 
offered a third explanation: that the concept of seeking 
political power for the poor through community action 
had failed, offending local officials while rarely aiding 
the poor. 
Success, more than failure, is the most likely explanation 
for the programs' elimination. For years, the legal services 
program has been "a bone in the throat of conservatives 
because it provides lawyers to combat government pro-
grams in court. "176 (emphasis added) These lawsuits were 
often costly and/or embarrassing to the government. The 
New York Times, in a strong editorial, noted that "once 
again, a Legal Services Director (Ted Tetzloff) in Wash-
ington has been fired for defending the program and fight-
ing its politicization" .177 He is the third director to leave 
that job "under fire" in the last 27 months.178 
It is far from clear that the programs were failures. Angry 
protests have greeted the announcement of termination 
- protests by those whom the programs were supposed 
to have failed. A number of OEO employees are working 
voluntarily, despite losses of their salaries, to keep the 
programs functioning for as long as possible. In its edi-
torial, the Times observed: 
the storefront lawyers for the poor have brought 
a fuller meaning to the idea of equal justice un-
der law ... This public service law has ... 
changed attitudes and courtrooms for the better 
while helping to restore faith in the legal sys-
tem.179 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of legal services' success 
can be measured by the vengefulness with which it is being 
destroyed. Phillip V. Sanchez, OEO director, has been re-
placed by Howard Phillips who has been assigned for the 
purpose of overseeing the OEO's dismantlement.180 When 
he fired the latest head of legal services, Phillips declared: 
Every country needs its Cato. Well, I'm going to 
be this country's Cato. Carthage was destroyed 
because it was rotten./ think legal services is 
rotten, and it will be destroyed. 181 (emphasis 
added) 
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The view of Phillips as Nixon's executioner is shared by 
others. Detroit's OEO Director James Oliver observed 
"Phillips is nothing more than a massive ball on the end 
of a wrecking crane."182 
But whatever the merits or failures of legal services and 
Community Action, the President's swift and unilateral 
action in dismantling them raises ominous questions. Be-
fore Congress has even had a chance to act on the budget 
proposal, OEO offices are being cut and staffs fired. This, 
despite the fact that the "92nd Congress, in renewing the 
agency, wrote into law a number of Erovisions intended 
to insure it against executive cuts."1 3 For instance, the 
OEO "director" was specifically barred from delegating 
OEO functions to any other agency.184 This has been cir-
cumvented by replacing OEO Director Sanchez with 
"acting director" Phillips.185 
The haste with which OEO has been dismantled was 
prompted by far more than mere "over-eagerness". A 20-
page leaked memo revealed the alarming degree of the 
Administration's contempt of Congress. The document 
entitled "Congressional Strategy on OEO", had been 
drafted by an OMB official. The memo suggested the fol-
lowing strategy to effect termination ofOEO: 
1 avoid "confrontation" on the constitutional 
power questions; 
2 steer debate on the issue to the House and Sen-
ate Appropriations Committees "whose interests 
most closely align with the President's"; 
3 dismantle the program quickly to present Con-
gress with a "fait accompli. " 
The memo even contained tactical suggestions, such as 
the following: 
develop adverse public and Congressional reaction 
to the scattered, angry demonstrations that are vir-
tually inevitable when these decisions are announced. 
(emphasis added)186 
Thus, the Administration's.haste was prompted by its 
fears that Congress did not share its feelings of the un-
desirability or failure of the program. This is the essence 
of disdainful, policy-making by the President. 
Absence of Fixed Criteria to Evaluate "Effectiveness" 
By refusing to announce the criteria employed in weigh-
ing a program's "effectiveness" the President has given 
himself tremendous lee-way in destroying those of which 
he does not approve. The true battle against inflation is 
compromised, and inefficiency in certain areas of the 
budget is encouraged, by this practice. In this regard, and 
because of the deception of the country involved, the 
President has performed a great disservice. 
No one is against helping the sick, the poor, the needy, 
the farmer, the unemployed, or the ghetto-dweller. Thus, 
when programs designed to do just that are cut back, the 
reason cited is invariably that the particular program has 
been inefficient, duplicative, or, in some way, a failure. 
This is a basic political maxim which cuts across partisan 
ai;id ideological lines. 
Some programs are really failures and deserve to be termi-
nated. However, the words "ineffective" and "failure" 
have been so debased by constant use for political pur-
poses that these classifications immediately arouse sus-
picion. Thus one of the dangers of selective definitions is 
the creation of a credibility gap. 
With these thoughts in mind, it is possible to examine re-
cent Nixon cut-backs and terminations of social programs 
which have been based on failure, duplication or ineffec-
tiveness. 
It is fair to say that no group has been more guilty of 
"overkill" in the use of these concepts than the present 
Administration. The President's budget message is filled 
with references to outmoded, inefficient, unwise programs: 
Common sense tells us that it is more important 
to save tax dollars than to save bureaucratic rep-
utations. By abandoning programs that have 
failed, we do not close our eyes to problems that 
exist; we shift resources to more productive 
use". 187 (emphasis added) 
With these words, over 100 programs were cut or termi-
nated'.188 
No one disagrees that failures and inefficient programs 
should be cut (though by Congressional action not Presi-
dential fiat). However, more than a label should be re-
quired before a program becomes a failure. The President 
has not outlined specific objective criteria against which 
all programs can be measured. Nor has he carried a bur-
den of proof before destroying "ineffective" programs. 
What is the cost-benefit ratio of Model Cities or OEO? 
What percentage of overhead is considered ineffective in 
feeding the poor? Who decides? Congress assumedly dis-
agrees with the President's evaluation because the "inef-
fective programs" have been strongly supported and re-
funded. 
There is no greater tool of policy than the power of selec-
tive definition. If inflation and tax increases must be 
avoided, all programs should be scrutinized for ineffici-
ency, not merely those not favored by the President. Un-
fortunately, the Administration's selective scrutiny has 
examined social programs with a microscope while es-
chewing even a telescope for defense-related areas. Even 
the most casual logician would be forced to conclude that 
there is a double standard operative in the following 
examples. 
While the President speaks of social programs whose 
"overlapping of responsibilities has increased the costs of 
government", 189 the army is building two air-defense 
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missiles which are virtually identical in function. 190 The 
improved Hawk System carries an $800 million price-tag 
while the SAM-D will require $5 .2 billion tax dollars 
(including $1.3 billion already in cost overruns.) But 
Congressman Aspin notes that "if the improved Hawk is 
as effective as army officials claim, then the SAM-D is 
simply not needed." Furthermore, the House Appropri-
ations Corr:nittee identifies no less than nine different 
laser or optically guided missiles in use or development 
by the navy and air force. 191 Strong words of criticism 
were pronounced on these costly examples of interservice 
competition.192 
The same fears of the burgeoning domestic bureaucracy 
are not applied to the Defense Department. "Today, 
there are some 900,000 fewer officers in uniform than ... 
in 1945, but we have about 5000 more colonels, lieuten-
ant-colonels, Navy Captains and Commanders ... " 193 
(emphasis added) 
In terms of audacity, no domestic department would 
dare ask Congress for one billion dollars to build a proj-
ect for which it did not yet even have the working draw-
ings. But with the proposed Trident missile-firing sub-
marine, the Navy did just that. 194 
And HEW, HUD and other such domestic programs are 
simply incapable of matching the Pentagon's inefficiency 
record in cost overruns. The General Accounting Office 
(GAO) released a report last year which documents in 
great detail the waste and inefficiency of such overruns.195 
In an examination of 77 weapon systems, the GAO dis-
covered that .the difference in original and revised esti-
mates totaled about $28.7 billion (31%) and that was 
before the systems had even been completed. 196 Thus the 
overruns are expected to run even higher. 197 
The Pentagon's way of dealing with this serious problem 
has not been to prevent overruns - it has been to try to 
hide them. The favored "cosmetic" method is to reduce 
the number of weapons bought, but accept the higher 
prices. Thus, had the Pentagon purchased the full num-
ber of ships, guns and missiles for which Congress had 
appropr~ated funds, the overrun figures would have 
reached almost $40 billion rather than the $28.7 billion 
quoted.198 
An equally favored device is silencing Pentagon em-
ployees. Untold billions of dollars in military aid and 
equipment is secretly given to foreign countries but no 
accounting is called for. 199 On the contrary, an official 
in the Pentagon's Comptroller's Office, J. Frank Crow 
admitted: \'Hell, man, that's my job.: to lose track of it." 200 
Executive Branch Deceptions 
Besides the obvious waste and inefficiency involved, the 
notorious cases of attempts to hide Pentagon waste raise 
serious questions of the Executive department's attempts 
to deceive the Congress and the public. Unfortunately, 
such deceptions have become common practice in the 
Administration's handling of budgetary affairs. A wide 
range of duplicitous devices have been created to conceal 
policy decisions and to misinform. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the Administration's handling of im-
poundment information. 
Withholding Information 
The first obvious area of deception concerns the supply-
ing of information to Congress. Previously, the statement 
was made that it was difficult to quantitatively compare 
Nixon impoundments with those of his predecessors. The 
reason is not that it would be so difficult for the Budget 
Bureau to keep accurate records, but rather that it is so 
difficult to get the Budget Bureau to give Congress accu-
rate information. 
For a long time, it was a formidable task to get any in-
formation. Requests for impoundment figures were ap-
parently viewed as unimportant or wastes of time. For 
instance, an informal request by House Appropriations 
Committee members that OMB merely keep them abreast 
of impoundment decisions was dismissed by (then) OMB 
Director George Shultz: 
I would not want to make a commitment that 
every time we turn around ... we make a report 
and send it around. Ifwe did, we would be buried 
in paperwork.201 
Thus, through reductio ad absurdum, the Administration 
dismissed a valid request for proper information. The 
members would probably have been quite satisfied with 
just the major pieces of information because of the tre-
mendous resistance Congress had met in seeking any im-
poundment data. According to Bill Goodwin, staff mem-
ber of the Separation of Powers Subcommittee, "We had 
a hell of a time. We had been after the budget bureau for 
three and a half years before the information was finally 
released."202 (The breakdown on impounded figures was 
given to the Subcommitt.:e during the 1971 hearings.) 
During this three and a half year period, a previous at-
tempt by the Subcommittee had produced a very dis-
torted report from the Budget Bureau in 1969. Writing 
in a law review, Senator Franch Church discussed the 
bureau's response: 
The document which took "months" to prepare 
... presents a very sparse listing of "reserving" 
incidents, and fails to even mention several 
examples of impoundment cited in the scholarly 
literature. In fact, the Budget Bureau seems to 
have been very careful to select only those cases 
that least call into question the practice of im-
poundment."203 (emphasis added) 
Then, restricting himself to only the "more blatant im-
poundments of military programs", Church notes some 
of the more conspicuous absences from the list: 1950 
cancellation of the aircraft carrier Fo"estal; 1949 cut-
back of the airforce by President Truman; 19 59 impound-
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ment of appropriated funds for construction of twenty 
superfort bombers; 1959 refusals to spend for the Polaris 
submarine and for support of the Marine Corps at a par-
ticular level.204 These are among the examples which 
have flooded the academic literature on impoundment, 
and, as Church suggests, "anyone casually acquainted 
with the history of impoundments must wonder how the 
Budget Bureau could have forgotten some of ... (these) 
examples. " 205 
Church's comments make clear that the problem was not 
so much one of amnesia as it was an outright attempt at 
distortion. If nothing else, the Bureau has always been 
renowned for its efficiency. 
The most recent list supplied by the OMB has been called 
"unacceptable" by Senator Humphrey.206 Humphrey 
had been the author of the '.'Federal Impoundment and 
Information Act" (P .L. 92-599) under which the Presi-
dent was obligated to inform Congress of impoundments. 
Although the $6 billion in unallocated water pollution 
funds is not even included in the report, it is the OMB's 
presentation of the admitted impoundments that Hum-
phrey found offensive. "The most striking aspect of this 
message is its incompleteness - full reasons for fund im-
poundment are not specified and little information is 
given as to when (we) can expect the funds to be ie-
leased."207 More particularly, Humphrey notes that two 
requirements, specified by law, were waived with a sweep 
of OMB's broad pen. 
The law requires that each impoundment action be ac-
companied by an estimate, to the maximum extent prac-
ticable, of the fiscal, budgetary and economic effect of 
the action.208 OMB simply dismissed this directive by 
observing that since the "reserves listed are consistent 
with the 1974 budget ... ", the estimated effects have 
already been reflected in the President's budget pro-
posal.209 Humphrey points out that neither the budget 
nor the iinpoundment list gives Congress any informa-
tion as to the specific effects that termination of, for 
example, REA (Rural Environmental Assistance) or the 
federal subsidized housing program will have on employ-
ment, inflation, or construction-materials production.210 
But this is precisely the information needed by Congress 
to establish priorities rationally through legislation. 
Another specific question, embodied in the Federal Im-
poundment and Information Act, was given the same un-
responsive treatment. The Act requires an estimation of 
the period of time during which the funds will remain 
impounded. The OMB replied by stating: 1) the Anti-
deficiency Act requires quarterly review of all apportion-
ment by OMB; 2) the period of impoundment is depen-
dent in all cases upon the results of the review .211 There-
fore, no estimates of duration of impoundments were 
given. 
In both these cases, OMB could have provided far more 
information than it did. But complying more fully with 
the law would have: 1) given Congress information which 
could prove embarrassing and 2) undermined the Admin-
istration's position that impoundment is inherently an 
Executive function and one in which Congress's role 
should be minimized. Underlying each denial of informa-
tion is this philosophy: 
Don't worry about how long the funds will be 
frozen. The same people who impounded them 
in the first place will be double-checking them-
selves every three months. 
Don't worry about the fiscal and other effects 
of our impoundments. We've figured it all out 
for you and it's all consistent with the budget 
we gave you. Now if you will just sign here ... 
These formulizations may sound unfair; however, OMB 
director Ash has basically said as much in testimony be-
fore Congress. Claiming that preliminary budget data is 
so complex that Congress could not "make meaningful 
sense out of the hundreds of thousands of bits of informa-
tion", Ash maintained that this information should be 
withheld.212 Congress should only be given the "finished" 
product - the Administration's spending recommenda-
tions.213 
The information which Ash wants withheld from Congress 
basically consists of the agencies' funding requests sub-
mitted to OMB for examination, revision and inclusion 
in the President's budget. Because agencies are expected 
to stand by the President's recommendations when testi-
fying before Congress, this information would really be 
the only way Congress could know how much the agen-
cies, as opposed to the President, felt they needed. With-
holding this information gives the President a quasi-
monopoly on fiscal decisions. Withholding impoundment 
information helps complete the circle. At both ends, the 
President is, in Senator Muskie's words, "spoon-feeding" 
the Congress. 
Misinformation 
When information is withheld, Congress is at least put on 
guard. When misinformation is offered, Congress is dis-
armed. The latter action is more disdainful of Congress, 
and more dangerous. 
Some examples of misinformation are revealed by an 
examination of the OMB hand-out "Budgetary Reserves: 
June 1972."214 Unfortunately, the description of the 
agencies and programs involved and the reasons for im-
poundment are so broad that it is difficult to find many 
abuses which might present themselves in a more detailed 
document. 
The OMB list is divided into two categories. The smaller 
one, in terms of dollar amounts ($1.5 billion), is entitled 
"Reserves for Reasons Other than Routine Financial Ad-
ministration, June 30, 1972". These impoundments, made 
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for broad policy reasons, such as inflation control, spend-
ing ceiling limits, etc., contain many of the rograms im-
pounded because of Presidential disfavor.21 A reasonable 
interpretation of the Antideficiency Act would label this 
entire list an unjustifiable use of impoundment. 
However, the misinformation is contained in the larger 
category of impounded funds ($9 .1 billion) entitled 
"Budgetary Reserves for Routine Financial Administra-
tion". The reasons given for these reserves are the await-
ing of 1) development of approved plans; 2) completion 
of studies for the effective use of the funds; 3) establish-
ment of the administrative machinery necessary to man-
age the programs, and 4) the arrival of certain statutorily-
prescribed contingencies. Furthermore, the hand-out 
states "the reserves established for routine financial ad-
ministration are recognized by all concerned to be tem-
porary defe"als and their need or wisdom is usually not 
questioned." (emphasis added) 
An unsuspecting reader would, of course, assume that the 
$9.1 billion was fully justifiable and that only the $1.5 
billion represented possible differences of opinion be-
tween Congress and the President. Closer examination of 
the "routine" reservations, however, reveals that this is 
not so. 
The most glaring example of deception involves the class-
ification of "Federal-Aid Highways: 1973 Contract Auth-
ority" as routine administration.216 No reason is sug-
gested in the hand-out for this impoundment. However, 
the amount involved, $5 .7 billion, is almost two-thirds of 
the entire $9 .. 1 billion of "routine reservations". 
Congress had specifically stated that these funds were not 
to be impounded. 217 This entire case has been argued in 
a Federal Court which found the impoundment unauth-
orized, illegal and in excess of executive discretion.218 Of 
special interest is the fact that during the trial the Ad-
ministration sought to justify the withholding not on 
routine administrative grounds but rather for the "pre-
vention of inflation of wages and prices in the national 
economy."219 Thus, two-thirds of the "routine reserves" 
are admittedly "broad economic and program policy" 
reserves. 220 
There are other inconsistencies in the OMB's hand-out 
classifications. For instance, included in the "routine" 
impoundments is $9. million for construction of the pre-
viously discussed Washington Aquarium.221 
The hand-out states that the money was withheld be-
cause the "facility cannot be constructed within the fund-
ing limits established by the authorization" .222 But, for 
two years, the full appropriation had been impounded 
because of inflation and similar broad policy problems.223 
At the time of the initial impoundment ( 1969) the funds 
were sufficient to complete the project.224 But after a 
two-year delay, with all work stopped and rising con-
struction costs in the interim, the 1969 amount was, of 
course, insufficient to complete the project in 1971. 
Thus, by "deferring" the project for a sufficient period, 
the OMB created a "legitimate" reason to then terminate 
it. On the books, it appears to be a perfectly justifiable 
businesslike exercise of executive discretion. But, as Pro-
fessor Bikel concluded "especially in construction con-
tracts, an impoundment for a period of years, like this, 
amounts pretty well to saying the project is dead."225 
Once the inconsistencies and distortions involved in the 
highway funds and aquarium case are recognized, certain 
phrases in the OMB hand-out begin to leap out at the 
reader. Among the often cited reasons for "routine" im-
poundments are: 
"amount in excess of 1972 needs" 
"excess of funds which could be effectively used" 
"will be released when needed" 
"awaits development of approved plans and 
specifications" (emphasis added) 
Any healthy skeptic must wonder about how these words 
are used and who defines them. 
Deceiving the Public 
Of course, the average citizen does not spend time read-
ing OMB compilations of budgetary reserves so that de-
ception of the public takes a different form. The upper-
most reason for deception of the public is for political 
advantage, particularly to pressure members of Congress 
who may wish to dispute the President's spending prior-
ities. Many Congressmen who might otherwise oppose 
the Administration's budget cuts have been so intimidated 
by the reckless charges which have been made that most 
experts expect the President to win the current battle of 
the budget. 
It is in the use of faulty either-or reasoning that the 
Nixon administration has attempted to gain the upper 
hand in budgetary matters. The Nixon message to Con-
gress and the American people is clear; either the pro-
posed budget cuts are acce~ted or the nation will face in-
creased taxes or inflation.2 6 
Eileen Shanahan, in an analysis of the budget for the New 
York Times, points out the obvious flaw in this reasoning: 
(There) is the implication that the Administra-
tion examined every single government spend-
ing program to determine whether it was worth 
less to the body politic than avoidance of a tax 
increase. 227 
Clearly, this was not done. Numerous critics have pointed 
out that two obvious alternatives to the Nixon cuts were 
ignored: tax reform to raise additional revenues and a re-
distribution of the burden of spending cuts. Either of 
these would have prevented the massive cuts in social 
programs while not increasing the risk of a general tax in-
crease or inflation. 
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The House Ways and Means Committee has begun hear-
ings on tax reform. Numerous tax inequities which bene-
fit big business and wealthy individuals have been dis-
cussed. "Capital gains, estate and gift taxes, real estate 
depreciation, rapid amortization of equipment, mineral 
depletion allowance and oil-well drilling costs are some 
of the areas urgently in need of reform."228 Despite this 
meaningful alternative to social program terminations, 
Shanahan observed that the budget was silent on the sub-
ject of taxes, "except to warn over and over (at one 
point, five times on a single page) that rejection of spend-
ing constraint would inevitably lead to the need to in-
crease taxes.'>229fhis silence is unfortunate because, ac-
cording to testimony taken by the Ways and Means Com-
mittee, upwards of $10 billion could be added to annual 
revenue through elimination of special privileges. 
The Administration also ignored the wide range of pos-
sible spending cuts - other than its own. Because a num-
ber of Congressmen have indicated a willingness to ad-
here to the President's ceiling figure, the real question is 
how to distribute the priorities within that ceiling.230 
Despite rhetoric about inflation and tax increases, it is 
here that the true conflict lies. During hearings, Congress-
man Whitten asked Administration officials whether the 
President would obey Congressional appropriations if 
Congress kept overall spending at or below the President's 
ceiling but rearranged spending priorities.231 According 
to the New York Times, "none of the Administration 
officials would give the committee any assurance that in 
that hypothetical case, the President would spend the ... 
(Congressionally-sanctioned) funds regardless of the total 
size of the budget.''232 Nothing could better demonstrate 
the Administration's duplicity and naked grab for power 
than this silence. 
Abuse for Partisan Political Objectives 
Thus far, a multitude of abuses have been documented, 
each entailing the substitution of Presidential policy judg-
ments for those of Congress. However, there is an addi-
tional abuse of impoundment which deserves special con-
sideration. Impoundment for purely partisan objectives 
cannot be justified by even the most distorted interpre-
tation of the Anti-Deficiency Act or the Constitutional 
prerogatives of the President. 
Nowhere is the Executive's power to "orchestrate events" 
for political advantage more apparent than in the selec-
tive freezing and unfreezing of funds. This power is em-
ployed both in election and non-election years. 
In non-election years, funds can be released to weather 
various political storms. Two advantages accrue. A Presi-
dent with good political acumen can release just enough 
of the funds to take the edge off mounting criticism or 
to temporarily placate strategic Congressional members 
while important legislation is pending. Secondly, when 
the problems ebb, the funds can be re-frozen. Like the 
operator of a dam, lowering the waters when storms 
threaten and then replenishing the reservoir, the President 
is generally in complete control. 
Though impoundment was not relied upon very heavily 
in the previous administration, President Johnson illus-
trated how impoundment storms could be ridden out. 
When $1.1 billion in highway trust funds were frozen, 
strong criticism began rising in the states. Accordingly, 
President Johnson released $175 million of the funds. 233 
Similarly, $791 million in other domestic funds were re-
leased "on the eve of a conference ... with governors."234 
The Nixon Administration is equally adept at backtrack-
ing when necessary. Because of impoundment, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) was forced to 
cancel an investigation into the reasonableness of prices 
and profits of the manufacturing subsidiary of A.T. & T.235 
This launched an intense public reaction,236 so OMB 
quickly released the impounded funds and recommended 
an increase in the FCC's next budget for the program.237 
Similarly, when anti-impoundment feeling reached a peak 
after the 1971 Hearings, President Nixon released some 
of the frozen funds.238 Selective action of this kind has 
also been used to placate Congress when important legis-
lation was pending. The administration felt that "there 
was no question" that Nixon Jost the SST because of im-
poundment.239 Therefore, in a "deep background" ses-
sion with reporters, Herb Klein predicted the release of 
funds by mid-May, 1971, to help secure votes for the 
President's revenue-sharing and reorganization plans.240 
Though OMB officials disagreed with Klein's prediction, 
they admitted "a certain amount always gets loosened up 
under pressure.''241 
In making daily impoundment decisions, the OMB is 
careful not to offend certain powerful Congressional 
chairmen. An ex-OMB official confided that certain Con-
gressional districts, those represented by these chairmen, 
are usually exempted from impoundments.242 A classic 
illustration of the role of partisanship in the administra-
tion of the budget occurred in the Truman administra-
tion. During a Jong briefing by Budget Bureau officials, 
Truman discovered that, in cost-benefit ratio terms, there 
was a stronger case for the construction of a dam in a 
state represented by two Republicans, than in Wyoming 
which was represented by a powerful Democrat, Senator 
O'Mahoney. Truman reportedly said: 
That's fine. You fellows do terrific work. That's 
why I like you. Now why don't you figure out 
a cost benefit ratio that lets Senator O'Mahoney 
have his dam.243 
Besides these day-to-day political adjustments, once every 
two years, a particular opportunity for abuse presents it-
self - elections. The financial spigot power can be used 
on a broad national basis to manipulate the economy for 
overall political advantage. It can also be used on the nar-
rower, district-by-district and project-by-project level as 
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Two weeks before the 1970 elections, $498 million in 
education furids were released.244 HEW Secretary Rich-
ardson was pointedly asked by the press whether the Ad-
ministration decision was affected by the up-colming 
election. He unsurprisingly responded: "there is no con-
nection whatsoever."245 
The reason for the Press's skepticism is obvious. Maxi-
mum psychological advantage can be garnered by the 
timely release of funds. The beneficiaries will often turn 
grateful eyes to the White House, tending to forget the 
previous period during which the funds were withheld 
and often, failing to question why they were frozen and 
then suddenly released. Furthermore, the release of large 
sums can temporarily retard unemployment or stimulate 
the economy if politically desirable. 
In early 1972, a number of leading Democrats voiced 
fears that funds would be released for maximum Repub-
lican advantage prior to the November election. How-
ever partisan these Democratic statements may have been, 
it appears they were correct. Senator Ervin, glancing ner-
vously at the $1.5 billion in "broad economic and pro-
gram policy objectives" noted that release of several bil-
lion dollars 
would provide a long-overdue stimulus to our 
sagging economy, and, I suppose that the occur-
rence of the resulting boomlet just before the 
presidential election this fall would be purely 
coincidental. 246 
Though Ervin's estimate was high, his prediction was 
essentially correct. On July l, 1972, $447 million of the 
non routine" reserves in REA, water and sewer grants, 
HUD loans and community assistance grants were re-
leased.247 
In January of 1972, Congressman William Anderson of 
Tennessee actually attempted to estimate the amount to 
be released in the second half of the fiscal year (Jan.-
June l 972) in anticipation of the upcoming election. 
Limiting themselves to two departments, HUD and Agri-
culture, his staff made informal inquiries to discover how 
much of the then-impounded money was to be released 
in this ~riod. Their rough estimation came to over $3.5 
billion. 8 
Noting that this $3.5 billion figure constitute approxi-
mately 80% of the total appropriated funds for these 
projects, Anderson screamed foul. "The tactic is simply 
this: spend at a 20% rate in a non-election year; 80% as 
an election rolls near". 249 
Besides the political aspects of the estimated release, 
Anderson was angry about the economic mismanagement 
involved. Citing the inconvenience, uncertainty, delays 
and layoffs, he concluded "such sporadic, shotgun dis-
bursement of Federal Funds is the grossest form of busi-
ness mismanagement and wastes countless millions. •>Z5o 
(emphasis added) 
To attempt to ·separate rhetoric from fact, Louis Fisher 
was later requested to look at the actual releases made by 
June 30th. His memo reveals that Anderson's predictions 
were essentially correct.251 The obvious footnote to this 
episode is to consider what happened after the election. 
Within two months, the President's new budget was re-
leased, and many of the programs which had been given 
a temporary stay of execution, such as Model Cities, Hous-
ing Subsidies, Urban Renewal, etc. were given the axe. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact degree 
of political manipulation involved when large amounts of 
funds are released prior to an election. Undoubtedly, 
there is some truth in the charges that "politics" is a 
strong motivating factor. But separating this from pos-
sibly legitimate factors is difficult. 
However, on the narrower, district-by-district level, con-
clusions drawn can be more reliable. Congressman Sisk's 
staff has documented a case which can only be described 
as "crass politics" at its lowest. The Westlands Water Dis-
trict episode is so illustrative that it bears lengthy re-
counting. 
On October 29, l 970, Congressman Sisk learned of an 
impoundment which would force the shut-down of part 
of the Westlands Water District project. The project had 
been the frequent victim of Presidential under-funding 
and impoundment in the past.252 This latest impound-
ment was of particular concern because it would cost 
over l 200 jobs in this exceedingly high unemployment 
area, as well as another year's delay in providing needed 
water for small farmers.253 
Fortunately for the district, California's Senator George 
Murphy was fighting for his political life against John 
Tunney. Murphy's seat was considered so important to 
the Republicans that President Nixon had joined him and 
Governor Reagan on a statewide election-eve broadcast. 
In view of the political emergency, a truce was called in 
the war against inflation in California's I 6th Congressional 
District. The election-eve broadcast was used as an oppor-
tunity to announce that Senator Murphy had been able 
to secure release of the funds to forestall the impending 
lay-off of California workers. The theme of successful 
"teamwork" between the Republican President, Senator 
and Governor was played to the hilt. Governor Reagan, in 
dramatic fashion, made the point: 
It was almost noon when they found me ... 
(concerning) a Federally-funded water project 
under construction - the money had not been 
released - and beginning Monday, there would 
have to be a lay-off of these California working 
men. 
I got on the phone to track down the Senior 
Senator of California ... By evening, the call 
came back from the nation's Capital ... 
The money has been released - there will need 
to be no lay-off of these working men in Cali-
fornia!254 
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Few releases of impounded funds have been as politically 
timely as this. But that is only half of the political drama 
which unfolded. 
Unfortunately for the Westlands Water District, and the 
"working men in California", the release was not timely 
enough to save Murphy's Senate seat. Soon after that de-
feat, Congressman Sisk learned that the $10 million was 
not going to be released! 255 
Congressman Sisk wrote a strong letter to the President 
protesting the continued impoundment and the political 
bad faith employed. Writing on behalf of the President, 
Caspar Weinberger explained that "no commitment was 
made to use the funds added by the Congress for the 
Westlands development." (emphasis added) Only the 
money which the Administration has requested in its own 
budget and then impounded, was supposedly promised 
for release. Weinberger concluded: 
It is indeed unfortunate that false hopes were 
raised. It is difficult to identify the cause - but 
I believe it resulted from a misunderstanding. 
Nevertheless ... the Administration has met its 
commitments ... 256 
The postscript is not surprising. The funds rei.iained with-
held until after the Ervin impoundment hearings in 1971 
when, along with funds for a number of other projects, 
they were unfrozen because of mounting pressure.257 
In August of 1972, Sisk's staff added: 
In this election year all our funds have been re-
leased ... they've given us so much that, if they 
had given it at the proper intervals, we could 
have used it more efficiently".258 
And a year and a half after the broadcast and election, 
Congressman Sisk was still wondering "what would have 
happened if he [Murphy] had won" .259 
None of the examples of impoundment being used as a 
political football are offensive merely because "politics" 
is being played. Presidents, no less than Congressmen, are 
politicians and will use numerous devices to improve their 
political standing. Rarely can a natural disaster occur or 
a project be christened without some politician attempt-
ing to capitalize on the event. 
What is offensive is that impoundment for partisan polit-
ical purposes lacks even the most "tenuous justification." 
However much the President may have distorted and 
abused the supposed Constitutional responsibility to fight 
inflation, prevent tax increases or replace inadequate pro-
grams - at least these, theoretically, are in the national 
interest. But using Congressionally enacted laws as so 
many political bargaining chips can be justified on abso-
lutely no such grounds. 
The dangers of this abuse are enormous. One person is 
given the power to manipulate the entire Federal budget, 
to dole out and withdraw needed funds purely to suit 
narrow, self-interested objectives. The entire theory of 
representative government is destroyed, and members of 
Congress are blackmailed or bribed with their own appro-
priations bills. 
As Congressman Pickle complained: 
To have someone try to buy my vote would 
anger me enough in itself - but to have some-
on.e ~ry to burromy vote with my own appro-
pnations ... 
VI Erosion of Congressional Power: 
Slippage Along Its Own Fault 
Congress has only recently awakened to a number of 
sobering facts. Appropriations laws have generally become 
recommendations, while the President's budget proposal 
is now law. The item veto which Congress has consistently 
refused to grant to the Executive has, nonetheless, sprung 
into existence. And Congress's role in setting national pri-
orities has been reduced to that of complaints and ob-
struction. 
Massive shifts of power such as these are too great to have 
occurred overnight or without Congressional compliance. 
If they are to be remedied, Congress must recognize how 
and why they have developed. If they are to be fully 
understood, Congress must view them as part of a far 
greater Constitutional crisis. If they are to be prevented 
in the future, Congress must begin to view itself as an in-
stitution rather than as a group of parochial lobbyists for 
particular sections of the country. 
Development of Executive Preeminence: Congressional 
Inefficiency and Irresponsibility 
Procedure 
The Congressional budgetary process is so outworn, in-
efficient and clumsy that it literally cried out for some-
body to save it. At various times, during this century, 
the President has volunteered; at other times, Congress 
has volunteered him; often circumstances left no choice. 
But however inevitable or understandable some of the 
power shifts have been, they nonetheless constitute a 
serious erosion of the separation of powers. 
One basic problem with the Congressional budgetary 
process is that it is splintered. Besides the obvious political 
differences which often become embroiled in budget de-
cisions (Senate v. House, Democrat v. Republican, Urban 
v. Rural, etc.) there is the overriding problem of a two-
step approval system. A ceiling figure for an agency is 
first approved by one of the various authorizing subcom-
mittees. The agency then takes the authorization to the 
proper appropriations subcommittee to see how much of 
it will be granted. This creates the problem. At each end 
of the process, subcommittees will often "pass the buck" 
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in setting dollar amounts. Congressman Pickle notes that 
authorizing committees will often give cursory considera-
tion to the proper amounts needed, fully expecting the 
appropriations committee to set the proper limit.261 
Meanwhile, appropriations committees often defer to the 
"expertise" of the authorizing committee and merely 
rubber-stamp its recommendations.262 
This irresponsibility is heightened by the fact that some 
bills are passed as tributes or favors to particular members 
of Congress or to score "political points" in the home 
d. · 263 M b 1stnct. any mem ers secretly hope that these bills 
will be vetoed or face impoundment. 
Besides encouraging abdication of responsibility on the 
individual committee level, the splintered appropriations 
process has led to irresponsibility on the overall Congres-
sional level. The system functions in such a way that each 
program is evaluated somewhat in a vacuum. Each com-
mittee knows how much a particular program is expected 
to cost and roughly how much income the government is 
expecting in the next year. But it does not know what in-
creases may be necessary for programs being evaluated 
by other committees. Thus, it might really be nice to 
give the Air Force its new bomber and, on the merits, the 
bomber may seem really economical. But Food Stamps 
or Revenue-Sharing might also be able to spend increases 
in a beneficial way. Nowhere in Congress does a broad 
overview committee sit to weigh these competing prior-
ities. The day of reckoning is usually postponed until 
much later when Congress is suddenly faced with the 
need to increase the deficit, raise taxes, expand the debt 
ceiling, or impose a spending ceiling on the Executive. 
Information 
Reform of the entire appropriations process would be 
meaningless if not coupled with drastic overhauling of 
Congress's outmoded and insufficient methods of com-
piling information. Totally inadequate staff and computer 
capability have forced Congress to rely almost exclusively 
on the Executive department for its information. 
Congress's inadequate staff would be laughable if it were 
notnot so serious. The OMB has a staff of 650-700 who 
spend a year preparing the President's budget. The com· 
bined House and Senate appropriations committees have 
six months and 79 staff members to review and alter this 
massive document.264 The staff shortage has reached such 
proportions that Senator Mondale recounts his experience 
in attempting to block a proposed increase in aircraft 
carriers during a hearing. It was a case of "myself and one 
college kid versus the U.S. Navy and everybody who 
wanted to build a carrier, or who had a friend who was 
an ensign or above." 2165 
Unfortunately, Congress's problems in securing informa-
tion run far deeper than inadequate staff and time. While 
the Executive branch utilizes 4000 computers in various 
ways, the Congress of the United States has allowed itself 
"at best three". And these are mostly operating part-time 
on payroll and housekeeping functions! 267 Concludes one 
observer, Congress has "the computer capability, roughly, 
of the First National Bank of Kadoka, S. Dakota" .268 
Congressional unwillingness to increase and update its 
information sources has had far more deleterious effects 
than mere inefficiency. It has forced Congress to rely 
almost totally on the Executive Branch for its informa-
tion. Thus, in its pivotal responsibility of monitoring 
Executive performance, Congress depends on informa-
tion and evaluations supplied by its charge. Such a system 
of checks and balances, were it to occur in a foreign coun-
try, would be labeled a sure sign of totalit<.rianism. 
The Executive branch has been quite eager to supply Con-
gress with information - at times. This responsiveness 
has been noted by Senator Mondale: 
Whenever I am on the side of the Administra-
tion, I am surfeited with computer print-outs 
that come within seconds to prove how right 
Iam ... 269 
Of course, when the news is less cheerful, the Executive 
is not as quick with its handouts: "But if I am opposed 
to the Administration, they (computer print-outs) always 
come late, prove the opposite point, or are on some other 
topic". 270 
Information is at times distorted, but Congress rarely has 
enough independent knowledge to even know what ques-
tions to ask.271 When they do know what questions to 
ask, and the answers are likely to be embarrassing, infor-
mation can be withheld on the grounds of "national 
security" or "executive privilege": witness Watergate, 
ITT, and the Pentagon Papers. 
Thus, Congress has left itself ill-equipped, uninformed, 
and wholly unprepared to handle budgetary affairs in the 
Twentieth Century. Tradition and reluctance to change 
may supply part of the explanation. Possible fear of ad-
verse public reaction to increased Congressional expense 
may also be a cause. Even a degree of laziness cannot be 
discounted. However, the crucial factor must be the self-
centered hoarding of power by influential Congressional 
leaders. Increased staffs, besides promoting efficiency, 
would necessarily entail a diminution of the power of 
these chairmen. Reorganization of the splintered appro-
priations process would entail a loss of power for at least 
certain Congressional leaders. 
Though the present system, in all its clumsiness, ineffi-
ciency and reliance on the Executive is harmful to the 
public interest, it is not likely to be reformed until it be-
comes harmful to entrenched Congressional Chairmen. As 
long as the White House can still be counted on for special 
favors and the sanctity of the "pork barrel" is not attacked 
in certain districts, the appropriations dinosaur will prob-
ably survive. 
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Abdications 
Though the present system adequately suits the electoral 
needs of incumbent Congressional leaders, it is wholly in-
adequate for discharging the national budget. Congress 
had admitted as much by granting increasing authority to 
the Executive in this area. In fact, the last fifty years may 
be characterized as a steady process of give and take: Con-
gressional give and Executive take. 
The process began with the Budget and Accounting Act 
of 1921, which established the Budget Bureau and the 
concept of a Presidential budget proposal. With this simple 
act, Congress l) granted to the President the right to set 
the agenda for Congressional budget considerations; 2) 
placed the nation's most valuable budget-making resource, 
the BOB, in the Executive rather than the Legislative 
branch; and 3) cut itself off from vital information by 
requiring that Executive agencies make their budget re-
quests to the President, not Congress.272 
In the following decades, whenever a national crisis such 
as war or depression would occur, Congress would tem-
porarily take itself out of the budget process by granting 
ad hoc impoundment powers to the President.273 To fight 
inflation and mounting deficits in the l 960's Congress 
passed a number of spending ceilings which created vari-
ous degress of Executive discretion in spending appropri-
ated sums.274 
From Truman to Johnson, Presidents have supplemented 
these broad powers by occasionally impounding sums in 
the absence of Congressional authorization to do so. How-
ever, since the Nixon Administration, impoundment has 
become a routine policy device. This ad hoc power, some-
times granted, sometimes taken, has now become an en-
trenched Presidential "prerogative." 
Unrestrained impoundment gives the President complete 
control of the budget. The process has now come "full 
circle", as the Executive l) sets the agenda, 2) controls 
agency testimony at hearings and now, 3) prevents any 
Congressional attempt to deviate from the game plan. As 
in the prelude to an earthquake, Congressional slippage 
had occurred gradually and imperceptibly until it was 
too late. 
Constitutional Crisis: One-Branch Rule 
Budgetary control is but one, albeit significant, compo-
nent of the across-the-board erosion of Congressional 
power. Its full importance can only be realized by con-
sidering the entire range of increasing Executive hedge-
mony in most areas of national decision-making. As with 
the budget, Executive control has been made possible by 
a combination of Presidential fault and Congressional de-
fault. But however the blame is apportioned between the 
two branches, the overriding fact is that the resultant 
Executive ascendancy has posed this century's Constitu-
tional crisis. 
Upon solid foundations erected by President Roosevelt 
and his successors, President Nixon has been able to con-
struct a "shadow" Congress within the Executive Office 
of the President.275 This facsimile has all the powers of 
the original: war-making, treaty ratification, confirmation 
of officials, powers of executive reoganization, budget 
allocations. In addition, it has some additional powers 
which recent Congresses have lacked: unfettered access 
to information, access to the President and his top ad-
visors, and a meaningful say in decision-making. With 
these additional powers, the shadow Congress runs more 
efficiently, if not as democratically, as the original. 
The requirement that only Congress could declare war, 
once regarded as the people's greatest protection against 
executive tyranny, has become all but meaningless.276 
U.S. troops have been committed to active duty in Korea, 
Lebanon, Dominican Republic, Cambodia, Laos without 
declarations of war. Congressional "approval" has only 
been sought, if at all, long after the troops have been dis-
patched. Though only Congress can declare war, Presi-
dents claim the power to declare "protective reaction 
strikes" and similar actions which are different from war 
in name only. 
For over a decade U.S. servicemen have been fighting and 
dying in one such non-war. They were brought there un-
der pretense ("advisors'"); their numbers were multiplied 
under pretense {the Gulf of Tonkin); their stay was 
lengthened under pretense {the annual "light at the end 
of the tunnel"). While Congress grew increasingly disen-
chanted with the Vietnam action, it was too late. Ameri-
can honor was at stake, prisoners were hostage, and sol-
diers were under fire. These faits accompli guaranteed 
continued Congressional appropriations. 
Undeclared wars can be ended through unratified treaties. 
The Kissinger-Tho peace settlement includes a provision 
for U.S. reconstruction aid to North Vietnam. If Congress 
balks at this, the aid can be arranged informally through 
a host of Executive bookkeeping devices which allow un-
told billions of dollars to flow into foreign countries 
without Congressional approval.278 Congress has been by-
passed in thousands of informal military and economic 
accords by the simple device of substituting the words 
"executive agreements" for "treaties". 
Congress could decide that it does not like the way that 
Henry Kissinger has handled his job. But there is nothing 
it can do about it. Though Kissinger is conceded to be 
the man in charge of American foreign policy, he was 
never confirmed by the U.S. Senate. Along with John 
Ehrlichman, Nixon's domestic affairs power-broker, 
Kissinger is a Presidential "advisor" accountable only to 
Mr. Nixon. By separating authority from title, the Presi-
dent has rendered the Senate's powers of confirmation of 
Cabinet officials meaningless. Republican Senator Percy 
has alluded to reports that the President would circum-
vent the plan to require confirmation of OMB Director 
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Furthermore, Congress cannot even ask men like Kissinger 
or Ehrlichman about how and why decisions are made. 
Executive privilege prevents them from testifying before 
Congress. This informal understanding between the branches 
has been so greatly expanded by the present administra-
tion that it is now being used to prevent administration 
officials from testifying before Congress about their 
knowledge of the commission of a crime: the Watergate 
bugging. This is particularly ironic given the Administra-
tion's feelings that even a newsman's First Amendment 
privilege doesn't extend that far. 
Any significant executive reorganization entails shifts 
in Congressional attempts to oversee the Executive de-
partment. Though Congress had so far declined to approve 
the President's proposed reorganization, the plan has 
nonetheless been effected. Three Cabinet appointees were 
recently elevated to the title of White House Counselor 
and given broader authority.280 
Long confronted with most of these losses of power, 
Congress had consoled itself with its powers over the 
purse. But with the Executive's plethora ef flexible spend-
ing devices and now, with the President's flaunting of 
Congressional appropriations, this too is being destroyed. 
In this final area of power, Congress is once again left 
holding an empty bag. 
Senator Humphrey had concluded that in the budgetary 
area, there is no need for Congress "to scrutinize the bud-
get, there is no need to appropriate funds. Indeed, there 
is little or no need for Congress'.281 Humphrey's state-
ment may be somewhat overdrawn. Were Congress to 
suddenly disappear, at least one man would be sorry to 
see it go. President Nixon would no longer have Congress 
"to kick around any more." 
Past Congressional Response: 
Cries of Wolf and Parochial Protest 
Since the opening of the 93rd Congress, there has been 
the promise that impoundment will constitute one of the 
great political battles of the next year. For a number of 
reasons, this previously obscure issue has sprung full-
grown into newspaper headlines and the daily lexicon. A 
pugalistic Congress has apparently crawled back into the 
ring and is squaring off with the Executive. 
However, for a more accurate evaluation, this current re-
sponse must be viewed from the perspective of past Con-
gressional reaction. Though past behavior is no certain 
guide to present action, particularly because there are 
now a number of significant new factors, it is important 
to note that many of the current angry Congressional 
statements have a familiar and somewhat empty ring to 
them. In the past, Congressional reaction has generally 
been restricted to nine parts talk and one part lethargy. 
Crying Wolf: A Case Study 
One of the more celebrated clashes between Congress 
and the President occurred in 1962 over the RS-70 (B-70) 
bomber. Though an intense debate had occurred in the 
House, the issue was ultimately resolved when two men 
"took a little stroll" in the White House Rose Garden. 
The entire incident, which is quite illustrative of Congres-
sional wavering;bears recounting. 
The controversy really began the previous year when 
Congress voiced concern that the Kennedy Administration 
was planning to phase out strategic bombers and rely, in-
stead, solely on intercontinental ballistic missiles. Ac-
cordingly, $695 million more than the Executive had re-
quested was appropriated (in fiscal 1962) for the procure-
ment of bombers and a more vigorous prosecution of the 
B-70 program.282 These funds were not spent despite a 
strong expression of Congressional desire.283 
Angered by this refusal, and fifteen previous defense im-
poundments, the House Armed Services Committee in its 
fiscal 1963 authorization, ordered the Secretary of the 
Air Force to spend not less than $491 million on the 
B-70.284 Leaving no doubt as to its intentions, the com-
mittee report said that the Secretary was "directed, 
ordered, mandated, and required" to spend the full 
amount.285 
This harsh directive was coupled with some of the 
strongest language ever used by Congress in denouncing 
impoundment. The accompanying report (House Report 
No. 1406) made clear that the Congressmen understood 
the full implication of the controversy.286 It noted that 
the committee's "extended and infinitely detailed hear-
ings" are not merely designed "as an exercise in·self-
improvement in the area of knowledge" but rather to 
give Congress information "to be used, not merely to be 
possessed. "The report offered one of the best descrip-
tions of Congressional decline in the area of policymak-
ing ever written: 
More and more the role of Congress has come 
to be that of a sometimes querulous but essen-
tially kindly uncle who complains while furiously 
puffing on his pipe but who finally, as everyone 
expects, gives in and hands over the allowance, 
grants the permission, or raises his hand in bless-
ing, and then returns to his rocking chair for an-
other year of somnolence ... 
Having clearly framed the issue, the angry committee ac-
cepted the Presidential challenge and declared itself ready 
to make the stand. "If this language constitutes a test as 
to whether Congress has the power to so mandate, let the 
test be made ... 287 
The President agreed and the test was made. Kennedy 
sent a letter "respectfully urging" deletion of the manda-
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tory language.288 This was followed up with a personal 
meeting with Vinson who agreed to change the language. 
Congressman Brown summed up the "confrontation": 
Yesterday two of the most distinguished Ameri-
cans of our time met together and took a little 
stroll in the Rose Garden behind the White 
House ... and discussed some of the provisions 
of the bill. 
As a result, the Committee ... agreed to ... 
change the wording ... (of the mandatory 
authorization. )289 
Vinson later explained to the House that the strong lan-
guage had been used to show the intent of Congress and 
to "force the Department of Defenst to take some action". 
Once "assured" that action would be taken, the commit-
tee wished to delete the mandatory language.290 
Louis Fisher has supplied the postscript to the story. He 
noted that after the House had acceded to the President's 
request: 
... the Administration went ahead with its plans 
to complete two prototypes ... before consider-
ing full-scale production. One prototype crashed 
in June, 1966, and the second now sits in the 
Air Force Museum at Dayton, Ohio.291 
Lessons from the RS-70 
Despite the stroll through the Rose Garden, neither side 
came out of the incident smelling very good. President 
Kennedy had "insisted" on a much greater degree of dis-
cretion than any impartial understanding of separation of 
powers could possibly permit.292 
Congressional action was suspect in a number of ways. 
First, as the Fisher postscript suggests, the plane had ap-
parently not been sufficiently tested to warrant produc-
tion. Thus, the initial use of mandatory language was 
quite irresponsible. 
One must ask why, after declaring a showdown, Congress 
withdrew after receiving little more than "assurance" that 
the program would be "re-examined". If the reason for the 
withdrawal was that Congress had known all along that 
the plane was not ready for production, then the Com-
mittee had performed a great disservice to itself and the 
Congress by framing the entire issue in broad Constitu-
tional terms of separation of powers. Congress can be just 
as guilty as the President in "crying wolf' or rhetorical 
overkill. 
Finally, one must wonder how much of the decision to 
drop thelanguage was motivated by form rather than sub-
stance. Was Chairman Vinson truly satisfied that the Ad-
ministration would seriously reverse its previous policy or 
was he, in effect, bowled over by the President's cour-
teous letter and personal invitation? Members of Congress 
are all too notorious for their susceptibility to Presiden-
tial niceties and social invitations. As Senator Ervin has 
sadly noted: 
Too often, I fear, there have been those among 
our ranks in the legislative who would rather re-
ceive a social invitation to the White House than 
display loyalty to the governmental institution 
to which they were elected.293 
Parochial Protest 
Congress has, in the past, often exhibited an interesting 
dichotomy. When protesting the broad Constitutional 
issues of impoundment, it has screamed bitterly but done 
little. However, when specific impoundments have hit 
specific programs or districts, the Congressional response 
has been more successful and funds have been released 
on an ad hoc basis.2!N 
This might be explained by the fact that Congressmen 
are far more concerned about impoundment as it affects 
them and their districts than they are about philosophical 
issues of separation of powers. Or, it can be explained 
by the fact that Presidents feel they can well afford to 
give in on specific decisions, when the pressure is strong, 
in order to preserve the broad power of impoundment. 
Both factors are probably at work. However, the end re-
sult reveals a far-sighted Executive protection, versus a 
narrow and short-sighted Congressional squandering, of 
respective powers. 
Over the years, Congress has perfectly played the role of 
co-optee to the President's able performance as co-optor. 
Timothy Ingram has observed: 
Congress has not helped itself any by the way it 
has chosen to attack the growing Presidential 
prerogatives. Mostly, the legislators have attacked 
such tactics as impoundment only to save a pet 
project, and often one of questionable worth. 
There are legendary stories about the abilities of 
subcommittee chairmen like Jamie Whitten to go 
to the source of authority and bargain, often 
continuing a program that everyone else wants 
killed.295 (emphasis added) 
·Furthermore, Congress members have been quite selec-
tive in voicing their Constitutional complaints. In 1971, 
the Wall Street Journal observed this phenomenon. The 
Journal contrasted impoundment critic Senator Ervin, 
who "hasn't been complaining of specific project freezes 
in North Carolina, though there have been some" with 
"many of the other avowed Constitutional-~eservers, 
who are alarmed at ice in the pork barrel".2 The article 
then listed a number of seemingly parochial complaints 
by some Congressmen and noted that "critics of big Pent-
agon spending aren't saying much about the $1.3 billion 
frozen military funds. Conservative lawmakers aren't 
loudly demanding release of $38 million in anti-poverty 
money". Even Senate Majority Leader Mansfield, one of 
the most respected men in the Senate, has been guilty of 
131 
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this selective reading of the Constitution. Though he sug-
gested in 1971 that the Administration be taken to court 
over the impoundment issue, in referring to a specific im-
poundment, of which he approved, he said "as far as I'm 
concerned, they can impound that from now till dooms-
day" .297 Statements such as that are certain to undermine 
the credibility of Congress's otherwise strong case. 
Besides selectivity, Congress members have been guilty 
of transparent "politics" in many of their actions and 
complaints. Referring to the recent Nixon budget cuts, 
an unidentified Senate Democrat indicated that "from a 
political standpoint", the best thing that could happen 
to the Democrats might be to "let government services 
dry up as a result of the Nixon cuts" .298 Perhaps he is 
correct that "the people would react against the Republi-
cans in the 197 4 elections". However, the callousness of 
the suggestion indicates that those people would not have 
a very viable alternative if fellow Democrats shared his 
manipulative views. 
This Senator is arguing that perhaps Congress should give 
the President enough rope to hang himself. However, in 
the process, thousands of powerless citizens will suffer a 
similar fate. Disregard of this fact belies the Senator's 
concern for the programs involved. 
VII Current Congressional Response: A New Seriousness? 
By most accounts, the 93rd Congress is expected to be 
one of the most "fiesty" and "contrary" in years. For 
the first time, Congress has indicated a willingness to 
tackle the great areas of Executive dominance: war 
powers, executive privilege, and the entire budgetary sys-
tem.299 More significantly, Congress has begun to con-
sider and undertake the necessary internal reforms which 
are a pre-condition of any successful Congressional chal-
lenge. However, there are already signs of Congressional 
hedging and backtracking, disunity and short-sightedness, 
which could turn the bright prospect of Congressional re-
assertion into a sour replay of the RS-70 confrontation. 
Reasons For the New Seriousness 
There are a number of factors which help explain why 
the current Congressional response seems more serious 
than previous threats of action. As noted, President Nixon 
has added new dimensions to the use of impoundment. 
Frequent use of the power on a broad scale may have 
finally alerted Congress that something has to be done 
and an unpopular minority President would seem the per-
fect choice for an opponent. Furthermore, because of the 
broad scale of current impoundments, more people, and 
more Congress members, have felt the direct lash of the 
President's whip. This could help to reduce the normal 
disunity which ordinarily hampers Congress as conserva-
tive and liberal, urban and rural, and Democratic and Re-
publican members are now forming unfamiliar coalitions. 
The proportionate increase in a wide number of other 
Presidential prerogatives (war power, executive privilege, 
etc.), reaching an apex in the Nixon Administration, has 
added more fuel to the fire. Each affront magnifies the 
effects of the others. 
But perhaps the most significant new factor is the con-
tempt of Congress which has been increasingly shown. 
President Nixon has made little secret of his disregard of 
Congress. Republican members have often felt more 
slighted than their Democratic counterparts when ex-
cluded from the normal "public relations" briefings and 
consultations with the President with which Nixon has 
largely dispensed. In recent hearings before Senator 
Ervin's subcommittee, Ralph Nader observed: 
It is President Nixon's great contribution to 
these hearings that he offended the sensitivities 
of the Congress. He did so in a bi-partisan, 
etiquette-breaching manner. Even now, one 
senses that too many members of Congress are 
upset not by what he has done, nor the means 
by which he has done it (via usurpation), but by 
the inconsiderate way he has gone about it. 300 
Combined, these factors may be sufficient to overcome 
the previous parochial limitations of the Congress. At this 
stage, reform, even for the wrong reasons, is desperately 
needed if Congress is to survive as a viable institution. 
Signs of the Congressional Offense 
In 1971, Hubert Humphrey trumpeted the charge "we're 
going to have a ring-a-ding on this one ... " (impound-
ment ). 301 And, indeed, Congress seems to be counter-
attacking on all fronts. 
A number of court challenges to impoundment are being 
undertaken or supported by members of Congress. 
Twenty-two Senators (including almost all of the stand-
ing committee chairmen) and five members of the House 
have filed amicus curiae briefs in the Missouri Highway 
Trust Fund Case.302 In January, 1973, Congressman 
George Brown filed a class action suit challenging the 
Nixon impoundment of $589.3 million appropriated to 
fight water pollution in California.303 Other court suits 
have been commenced and still others can be antici-
pated. 304 
Congress has also begun to assail the practice on a pro-
gram-by-program basis. Senate Majority Leader Mansfield 
signaled his intention to ask the Senate to revive nine 
bills vetoed by the President after the adjournment of the 
92nd Congress.305 Furthermore, both the House and 
Senate have begun to pass bills, in mandatory language, 
to reinstate programs cut by the President's budget. 
Probably the first of these to reach the President's desk 
will be the bill to revive the Rural Environmental Assist-
ance Program (REAP). The program was killed by a $210 
million impoundment in December, 1972. Within three 
months, both Houses had voted to restore the program. 
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The House vote was 251-142 ( 11 votes short of the num-
ber needed for override) while the Senate approved the 
mandatory spending by a wide 71-10 margin (easily 
enough to override a veto.)306 
REAP was apparently carefully chosen as the vehicle for 
the first challenge to the President.307 The program en-
joys such wide bi-partisan support that "every President 
since Harry Truman has failed in attempts to curtail or 
end it" .308 Nevertheless, the President has announced 
plans to veto the bill.309 
Much more than REAP's fate will be determined by the 
President's success or failure. REAP will represent the 
first test of strength of the respective impoundment and 
anti-impoundment forces. Each side shares the belief that 
the first few skirmishes will largely determine the out-
come of the entire budgetary battle. Thus, an intense 
lobbying campaign can be expected by both sides. In the 
balance will hang the crucial 11 House votes currently 
needed to override the President and establish the credi-
bility of the anti-impoundment movement. 
On two other fronts, Congress has established early suc-
cesses. The Senate voted 64-17 to require confirmation of 
the OMB director. 310 Because ofOMB's central role in 
impoundment, this must be seen all another indication 
that Congress has grown increasingly serious in its con-
cern over the practice.311 Meanwhile, the House, by an 
overwhelming margin of 297 to 54, has voted to require 
the President to spend an estimated $220 million for rural 
water and sewage projects before the end of the fiscal 
year on June 30.312 In these, and in countless pending 
votes, the crucial factor is not passage, but rather, passage 
by a sufficiently large margin to ensure override of the 
inevitable Presidential vetoes. 
Though both Houses are currently involved in these stop-
gap measures to protect endangered programs, there is a 
growing recognition that impoundment must be fought 
on a broad institutional level, rather than case-by-case. 
Members in each House have, therefore, presented bills 
intended to curb the practice itself rather than merely to 
revive its countless victims. These bills would limit the 
President's discretion and ensure varying degrees of Con-
gressional consent to impoundment as each case arose. 
The most notable Senate Bill is S283 proposed by Sena-
tor Ervin. Forty-five co-sponsors have already been en-
listed and passage of the bill is anticipated. 313 Basically, 
the proposal would require the President to inform each 
House of any Executive action which effectively "pre-
cludes the obligation or expenditure of the appropriated 
funds." If both Houses did not approve the action within 
60 days, the President would be obligated "to cease the 
impounding." 
The basic thrust of the proposal is admirable. 314 It at-
tempts to ensure Congressional participation in the full 
range of impoundment activities and it profierly places 
the burden of persuasion on the President. 15 
However, the Ervin approach does have a number of im-
portant weaknesses. Comptroller General Staats and 
Ralph Nader have both pointed out that there is no indi-
cation in the bill of how long the President must "cease" 
impounding. He could release the funds after the 60-day · 
period and then impound them again - indefinitely. 316 
More basically, Nader has noted that the proposal gives 
the President "sixty days worth of impoundment on any 
issue" during which Congress would be helpless.317 Senate 
Majority Whip Robert Byrd has suggested that it might 
be preferable to require Congressional approval before 
rather than after the fact. 318 Nader has endorsed this 
idea, pointing out that the President must seek prior 
Congressional approval before increasing spending 
(through a supplemental appropriations request), and 
wondering why the same formal procedure should not 
be required before decreasing spending.319 Imposing the 
requirement that a formal request be made, subject to 
possible committee hearings when appropriate, would do 
much to reduce the "all-or-nothing" and "hurry-up" ap-
proach implicit in the Ervin proposai.320 
The House has produced three different approaches to 
impoundment. Under a proposal by Congressman Silvio 
Conte, the President would not be given 60 days of "free" 
impoundment.321 A second approach, suggested by a 
number of Congressmen, is quite similar to theErvin pro-
posal. 322 House Appropriations Committee Chairman 
George Mahon has offered yet a third alternative. 
The Mahon plan, if approved, would probably do more 
harm than good. Under its provisions, an impoundment 
would stand unless the appropriations committees re-
ported out, and each House approved, a concurrent reso-
lution of disapproval.323 In effect, each appropriations 
committee, and particularly each appropriations chair-
man, would have a near veto over any Congressional at-
tempt to disapprove the impoundment. If the influential 
members of an appropriations committee supported the 
President's action, they could simply refuse to report out 
any resolution. This would hamstring the entire Con-
gress. Concentration of so much power in the hands of 
the appropriations committee leaders would lead to little 
more than "confrontation among oligarchs."324 
Passage of the Mahon bill could be disastrous. Spending 
decisions would not be democratized by substituting 
three-or-four-man rule for one-man rule. Congress's 
powers would not be restored; rather a few influential 
members would be given more bargaining chips for their 
dealings with the President. Worst of all, criticism of im-
poundment would be muted. The President would be 
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Prospects of Broad Budgetary Reform 
Little will be gained by passage of an anti-impoundment 
bill unless Congress simultaneously puts its budgetary 
house in order. Fortunately, there are hopeful signs that 
Congress has accepted the challenge. 
Looking towards the future, a special joint committee of 
senior members of Congress unanimously approved an 
interim report calling for major innovations in the bud-
getary process.325 The report calls for the creation of a 
"budget committee" for each house to establish annual 
spending ceilings and a goal for revenues early in each 
session. Furthermore, a procedure would be created for 
reconsideration of the spending ceiling and revenue goal 
late in the session to reflect changing economic require-
ments. 
Though the interim report did not address several key 
questions (e.g. how to allocate the total amount among 
the various committees and how to ensure Congressional 
compliance with the limits), it represents a new departure 
for Congress. For the first time, an overall appraisal of 
revenues and spending would be made directly in Con-
gress and reliance on Executive responsibility would be 
commensurately reduced. 
This proposal, however significant in the long-run, would 
do little to help Congress address this year's budget con-
flicts with the President. Accordingly, Senate Democrats 
have unveiled an unparalleled prop,osal for the current 
fiscal year - "a counter budget". 26 This alternative to 
the President's budget, being prepared by the Senate 
- Democratic Policy Committee, is intended to demon-
strate that Congress can act "responsibly" in fiscal mat-
ters. Therefore, any deficit in it will not be larger than 
the 12.7 billion figure called for by the President, and 
the budget will include an outlay ceiling. However, that 
is where the similarity will end. 
The purpose of the counter budget is to recognize the 
need for overall fiscal responsibility, but ensure that Con-
gress, rather than the President, orders priorities within 
those broad limits. Thus, the alternate budget will call 
for decreased military and foreign aid spending in order 
to save the domestic programs slated for termination by 
the President.327 In addition, tax reform proposals will 
be included to increase government revenues without 
adding to the tax burdens of middle-income or poor 
families. 328 
Once approved by the Democratic Policy Committee, the 
budget will be presented to the full Senate Democratic 
caucus for debate and conside~ation. If approved, it will 
become official party policy and Democratic chairmen 
within the Senate will be expected to respect its guide-
lines and limitations. 
Of course, such a plan, at this stage, is still highly prob-
lematical. To be effective: l) the Senate Democratic cau-
cus will have to approve it, 2) committee .chairmen will 
have to respect it, and 3) the House will have to make 
similar provisions. However, th~ possibilities of House 
co-operation in this plan have been enhanced by a num-
ber of reforms which have been instituted by the House 
Democratic caucus.329 These reforms are intended to 
shift power from the independent committee chairmen 
to the party leadership and caucus. Strengthening of the 
central party leadership would be essential for the coun-
ter budget to succeed. If Senate and House Democratic 
leaders are able to strengthen their powers vis-a-vis the 
chairmen, the Congress may be able to reassert its test 
powers over Federal spending. 
Overall Prosepcts for Change: Institutional Obstacles 
Block Reform 
Despite the outbreak of a flurry of reform activity, the 
overall prospects for change are not encouraging. The 
reasons are rooted deep in the institutional nature of 
Congress. Entrenched powerful interests and the parochial 
perspective of Congress must be overcome before mean-
ingful reform will be possible. 
As with most institutions, those in Congress who have 
the power to effect change in the status quo are those 
who stand to lose the most by any such change. For 
Congress to limit spending and order priorities effectively, 
binding restrictions would have to be placed on the inde-
pendence of committee chairmen. Power would have to 
flow from these Congressional fiefdoms to the central-
ized majority party leadership. 
Although a number of chairmen have supported individual 
anti-impoundment actions (suits, bills, etc.), their sup-
port for the necessary broad structural realignment of 
Congress is far more doubtful. In this area, the feudal 
lords of Congress can be expected to ward off encroach-
ment of their authority with the full range of the powers 
of their office. Whenever possible "objectionable" reform 
measures will be killed in committee. If reform bills do 
reach the floor, individual members may find themselves 
pressured by the tremendous leverage their chairmen can 
exert to punish or reward them at the committee level.330 
In the past, a chairman has rarely been challenged be-
cause, as a committee staff director remarked, "there's 
no percentage in it. He could make the committee mem-
ber's life miserable and futile for a long, long time". 331 
A Congressman's life can be made just as miserable by an 
angry President. Fear of Executive retaliation is a second 
major obstacle to reform. Congressman Joe Waggoner of 
Louisiana has already indicated where his loyalties will 
lie in the up-coming budget battle between Congress and 
the President: 
I'm not going to get myself into a position of 
being so much against the Administration that I 
can't talk to agencies when I need help. I've got 
36
Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 3 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol3/iss2/1
some things I need that are bigge~ than these 
332 little itty bitty programs the President has cut. 
(emphasis added) 
Chief among Waggoner's "broader" concerns is the secur-
ing of funds for a navigation project on the Red River 
in his district. 333 
The central paradox of this position is obvious. Congress-
men like Waggoner are so preoccupied with the scramble 
for the "golden eggs" that they are willing to let the 
"goose" escape. Republican Senator William Saxbe has 
helped explain this parochialism. The duties of respon-
sible lawmaking have often been eclipsed by a more basic 
need. "Congress has declined into a battle for individual 
survival ... [where] if you don't stick your neck out, you 
won't get it chopped off."334 
For House members in particular, survival means one 
thing - constantly running for re-election. And re-elec-
tion usually is believed to depend upon continually pro-
viding "service" to the home district. The key to such 
service is held jointly by powerful committee chairmen 
and the President, both of whom have a common interest 
in preventing major Congressional reform of the budget 
process. 
The President has already begun his campaign against his 
Congressional foes. The extent to which he can _ut~iz~ 
the media to maximum political advantage can intimidate 
all but the most determined potential renegades in Con-
gress. Economists and political scientists c_an afford to_ 
scoff at the simplicity of the Nixon assertion that devi-
ation from his budget will result in a 15% tax hike or in-
335 c f . creased prices for most Americans. ongressmen acing 
re-election do not have that luxury. 
The President can supplement this general broadside 
with the unspoken threat of specific political impound-
ments. The past use of impoundment in such ways should 
sufficiently establish the credibility of such a threat. 
A unified Congress could largely destroy the axe which 
the President holds over the heads of individual mem-
bers. However, from each member's own perspective, the 
danger of antagonizing the President usually outweighs 
the prospects of success. Here, again, there does not seem 
to be much "percentage in it." 
That body, renowned for the abilities of its members to 
Jog-roll to save pet projects, appears totally incapable of 
log-rolling to save its waning institutional powers. Be-
cause voters remain less interested in preserving Congres-
sional prerogatives than in obtaining Feder~! fund~ for 
needed pJojects, Congress is likely to remam fractional-
ized and cautious. Revolutions have never been waged by 
the cautious and wary, and reassertion of Congressional 
spending control would be little less than a revolution. 
The Stakes 
In the battle for the budget, the stakes are far greater 
than individual programs or projects. lmpoundment has 
become a central battlefield in the struggle over the Con-
stitutional Separation of Powers. 
No power was more carefully entrusted to Congress than 
that over the purse and in no area was the President as 
carefully restricted. Congress was given this ultimate 
power for both positive and negative reasons. Affirma-
tively, it was believed that Congress, collectively, would 
be more sensitive to the needs of all the people than 
could any President. 
The great function of Congress is to harmonize 
diversity, to compromise the differences, to ar-
rive at a solution that the nation as a whole can 
live with in peace.336 (emphasis added) 
Inherent in that compromise is waste, inefficiency and 
some abuse. Numerous unneeded projects have been 
funded to serve special interests and for political expedi-
ency. However undesirable, this was considered tolerable 
because of the second basic reason for Congressional con-
trol over spending. The Constitution unequivocally pre-
fers the risks of Congressional abuse to those of Presiden-
tial abuse. Some unneeded highways and military bases 
were seen as a small price to pay to prevent the concen-
tration of spending policy decisions in a single individual. 
Although the President is currently amassing control of 
the budget, an action so feared by the Founders, an 
equally great danger is being evidenced - the overall de-
terioration of the system of checks and balances. The 
genius of the American system is that it allows a strong 
President to offset the conservativism and inefficiency of 
Congress. Change is thus encouraged, but in a controlled 
environment. As the President rises to pre-eminence, 
those controls are destroyed. 
The Presidency is the antithesis of the Congress. The 
ability to act, to act swiftly and with one mind, gives _the 
President awesome powers vis-a-vis Congress. As the smgle 
personalized branch of government, the Executive has an 
unmatched mass appeal to the public - acting as spokes-
man and moral leader for the country. And given the 
comparative invulnerability of incumbency, the President 
has far greater potential for rising above parochial pres-
sures to act in a visionary way, for the greater good.337 
Ideally, the President and Congress complement each 
other. The President can overcome the institutional weak-
nesses inherent in a collective body of representatives; 
the Congress can check the natural dangers of a powerful 
and efficient Executive. 
This ideal system has broken down. In the face of too 
much Congressional inefficiency, America has become 
increasingly tempted by the President's ability to get 
things done. In foreign affairs and now in domestic af-
fairs, Congress has been forfeiting its authoirty. Congres-
135 
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sional resistance to change in its out-moded budgetary 
system will ensure continuation of this trend. 
The Constitution gave Congress its powers but only Con-
gress can act to secure them. Supreme Court Justice 
Robert Jackson, voting with the majority in the Steel 
Seizure Case to strike down the President's "emergency" 
measure, had a prophetic warning for Congress. He noted 
the importance of maintaining the separation of powers, 
then added: 
But I have no illusion that any decision by this 
court can keep power in the hands of Congress 
if it is not wise and timely in meeting its prob-
lems ... We may say that power to legislate for 
emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, 
but only Congress itself can IJlevent power from 
slipping through its fingers. 3 
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President can unilaterally amend the Consti-
tution by renaming Constitutionally-prohib-
ited practices. Congress could not pass an 
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recommends agency proposals for inclusion in 
the President's program; regulates the legisla-
tive clearnace process of the White House; and, 
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mouth and hands of the President. Antagoniz-
ing it can spell darkness or doom for any 
agency or official of the Federal Government 
and OMB is quite sensitive about agency heads 
departing from the President's budget recom-
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151 New 
152 Fisher, "Politics," p. 114;Fisher,Memo, 
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"conceptual difficulties" mentioned, Ander-
son's staff had more problems estimating the 
Agricultural programs. They were approximate-
ly $250 million too low in estimating the re-
serves that would remain in the agricultural pro-
grams after June 30. But this is only 7% of the 
$3.5 billion figure they were assessing. 
The article puts the OMB figure at 650. How-
ever, more recent accounts put the figure at 
700. See, Mary Russell, "Putting Congress Back 
Together Again", Los Angeles Times, March 18, 
1973, Part IV, P. 6. 
ings, op.cit, p. 24. Charles Lichenstein, FCC 252 "Public Works, Pollution Control, and Power 
Unfortunately, the 650 figure was not broken 
down into budget review people vs. "others". 
However even with that breakdown, the dis-
parity would be staggering. Furthermore, the 
OMB is a tightly-knot organization with the 
longest "institutional memory" in the govern-
ment. OMB budget examiners have full access 
to the knowledge and expertise of the full 650 
member compliment (e.g. program evaluator, 
etc.) and the institutional records, projections, 
figures, etc. 
Chairman Burch's Administrative Assistant, said Development and Atomic Energy Commission 
that the funds were released to continue the in- Appropriation" Hearings, before a Subcommit-
vestigation. Telephone interview, August 21, tee of the House Appropriations Committee, 
1972. 9lstCong., 2nd sess., Part 5, p. 800-801. 
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berger ... neither committee seemed interested 
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enough in information on the impoundment 
procedure and decisions behind the upcoming 
budget to want to conclude the hearings until 
after the budget appeared." "A 'Tough' Con-
gress",New Republic February 3, 1973. 
Furthermore, a really serious Congress could 
apply tremendous informal pressure to release 
funds. Threats to deny funds for Presidentially 
desired programs could easily unblock frozen 
funds. The Executive department has to come 
before the Appropriations Committees almost 
daily with requests for supplemental appropria-
tions, approval of reprogramming requests, etc. 
One example of this ability to exert pressure 
occurred in 1971 when Congress included an 
Anti-lmpoundment Amendment in an Act 
which amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 
312 "Senate, House Rebuff Nixon on Rural Aid," 
San Francisco Chronicle, March 2, 1973, p. 10. 
313 For a list of the 45-co-sponsors, see Congressio-
nal Record - Senate January 16, 1973 at S636. 
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Record - Senate, Feb. 7, 1973, at S2247-48. 
315 The burden is placed on the President by re-
quiring full Congressional approval rather than 
absence of Congressional disapproval. 
316 "lmpoundment;Congress Wants Control Over 
Spending," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Re-
view, Volume XXXI, Nov. 5, Feb. 3, 1973. 
p. 248. 
It has put a serious dent in the seniority system 
by making committee chairmen subject to con-
firmation by the caucus. It has opened up for-
merly closed committee hearings. It has restrict-
ed the use of closed rules that prevented 
amendments to bills on the floor. It has given 
subcommittee chairmen more authority to act 
independently of their chairmen. 
It has limited the number of major committee 
assignments for each member. It has put the 
House Leadership on the Committee for Com-
mittees and voted to form a Policy and Steer-
ing Committee to recommend policy stands to 
the caucus and possibly the committees. 
1961. Section 658 precluded release of appro- 317 Impoundment Hearings, 1973, p. 35. Nader 
What all this signifies is that an important shift 
in power in the House is already under way - a 
shift away from the independent chairmen and 
toward more central authority. See Mary Rus-
sell, "Putting Congress Back Together Again," 
reprinted in the Los Angeles Times, March 18, 
1973, part VI, p. 1. 
priated funds for Foreign Military Sales until is also concerned that passage of the bill might 
the President released funds for a number of be construed as Congressional approval of pre-
domestic programs, which has been impounded. vious impoundments. He, therefore, urges that 
(See HR9910, Sec. 658, 92nd Cong., 1st. Sess., the legislative history of the bill explicitly state 
October 21, 1971.) Because of his desire for that in no way does passage indicate any ap- 330 Among the more potent weapons available to a 
the military assistance funds, the President did proval of previous impoundments. strong chairman are 1) the power to set-up or 
release the funds impounded during the parti- disband subcommittees; 2) the power to ap-
cular fiscal year. Despite the success of the anti-318 Congressional Record - Senate, Feb. 7, 1973, point subcommittee chairmen; 3) the power to 
impoundment rider, Congress has not pursued at S2248. direct bills to favorable or unfavorable subcom-
this course in subsequent years. mittees, thus largely determining the fate of the 
300 Impoundment Hearings, 1973, p. 33. 
301 National Journal, "lmpoundment," p. 1032. 
302 Impoundment Hearings, 1973, p. 34. 
303 This figure is California's portion of the $6 bil-
lion in funds to fight water pollution nation-
wide which were withheld by the Administra-
tion. See "Nixon Sued Over Blocked Funds," 
San Francisco Chronicle, January 27, 1973, 
p.14. 
319 Impoundment Hearings, 1973, p. 38. bills;4) the power to hire, fire and largely con-
320 Ibid. 
trol committee staff members; 5) a miscellany 
of bargaining chips, such as helping name con-
ference committee delegates or floor managers 
of bills, which can be doled out or retracted to 
exert pressure. 
321 Conte's bill, HR. 415, would require the 
President to obtain Congressional approval 
before, rather than after, any impoundment 
could be made. Conte's bill is, thus far, the 
most desirable proposal which has been set 
forth legislatively. See copy of the bill on p .. 131 
of the Impoundment Hearings, 1973, and 
331 Quoted in Who Rules Congress, by Jim Fallows, 
Mark Green and David Zwick, A Bantam/Gross-
man Book, New York, 1972, p. 71. 
Conte's discussion of his proposal, pp. 129-130.332 quoted in Norman Miller "Nixon is Sure to Win 
322 Congressmen Pickle, Sarbanes, Harringston and 
304 There are at least 7 other cases dealing with im- William Ford have co-sponsored a bill similar to 
Battle of the Budget Despite Howls of Foes," 
Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 1973, p. 1, 13. 
poundment which are currently being litigated. the Ervin bill. Impoundment Hearings, 1973, 333 Ibid. 
For descriptions of these cases, and supple- p. 204. 
mental materials including complaints, defenses, 334 Quoted in Time Cover Story, p. 15. 
etc., see pp. 908-1010 of Impoundment Hear- 323 For a description of the Mahon bill, HR. 5193, 
ings, 1973. see ''The Case for Congress," New York Times, 335 Statement made by the President in a nation-
305 John Averill, "Mansfield Vows to Fight Nixon's 
Editorial, March 18, 1973, p. 12E. wide radio and television address, March 29, · 
1973. 
Freeze of Funds," Los Angeles Times, Decem- 324 The phrase is taken from Professor Bickel's re-
ber 17, 1972. marks about the undesirability of leaving im-
306 For the House Vote, see "House Votes for Bill 
Nixon Killed," San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 
poundment decisions to the leaders of the Ap-
propriations Committees. Seeimpoundment 
Hearings, p. 31. 
8, 1973, p. 8. For the Senate Vote, see "Senate, 
House Rebuff Nixon on Rural Aid," San Fran- 325 For a fuller description of the interim report 
cisco Chronicle, March 2, 1973, p. 10. and the proposed budget reforms, see Edwin L. 
307 James Naughton, "Struggle Over the Power of 
the Purse," New York Times, February 11, 
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326 For a fuller description of the counter budget, 
see James Naughton, "Democrats in Senate 
Plan Budget to Counter Nixon's," New York 
Times, March 18, 1973, p. 1. 
327 Ibid. 
311 It is also an indication of growing Senate anger 328 Ibid. 
at the use of non-confirmed "advisors" in key 
policy positions within the Administration. 329 Washington Post Columnist Mary Russell dis-
cussed a number qf1 sw:h. 'ii:forms instituted by 
the House Democratic Caucus: 
336 Quoted in Russell, op.cit., f/n 386. 
337 It is generally conceded by most political sci-
entists that "respect for the office" and the 
ability to "orchestrate events" for political ad-
vantages makes the incumbent President all but 
invulnerable. President Nixon was able to sail to 
a massive victory after waging a "non-campaign" 
largely because of these advantages. 
Because of the tremendous advantages of in-
cumbency, a President is not answerable to the 
public, in terms of political pressure, to the 
same extent as are members of Congress. This 
means that Congressional action constitutes the 
single most important restraining influence on 
the President's actions. Therefore, to the ex-
tent that Congressional influence is minimized, 
this important political check is destroyed. 
338 Excerpt quoted in "The Supreme Court's Role: 
Will it Referee the Fight?," Los Angeles Times, 
Sept. 18, 1973, part VII, p. 5. 
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